I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Civilians in northeast Nigeria are caught in the middle of an ongoing conflict between the Government of Nigeria and multiple armed opposition groups (AOGs) that have grown from Boko Haram since 2009. Tens of thousands have lost their lives, with many more injured and millions displaced from their homes and facing food insecurity. In recent years, the government, in conjunction with community militias, has retaken much of the territory previously seized by armed groups and secured Maiduguri and other key towns across Borno state. Their efforts to defeat AOGs have been complicated, however, by a well-documented history of civilian harm and abuse by government security forces resulting in poor civil-military relations generally, and particularly in the northeast. In addition, the military lacks the ability to effectively mitigate risks to civilians as a result of its presence in local communities across the northeast and its operations against AOGs.

This problem has been compounded by the Government of Nigeria’s challenges holding security forces accountable for their actions or to otherwise take responsibility for civilian harm.

In 2018, Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC) began engaging with communities and the military in northeast Nigeria to address the civil-military relationship, which according to civilians in the region, is a critical component to realizing improved protection. Recognizing that civilians are the best agents of their own protection, civilians began advocating for their own protection through local community protection committees (CPCs) with CIVIC’s support. The goal of these committees was to first assess the threats to the community, and then to pursue improved protection outcomes through advocacy and engagement with...
security forces. In parallel, CIVIC began by providing training to Nigerian security forces on the protection of civilians (POC) and civilian harm mitigation (CHM). Finally, civilians participating in the CPCs and military leaders deployed to the community began engaging in new dialogue concerning protection threats and the local civil-military relationship. This encouraged civilians to regularly engage with security forces to advocate for their protection from AOG attacks and raise concerns related to abuses committed by both state and non-state forces. This brief is intended to be a reflection on the dialogue and engagement process in Banki and Monguno since 2019.

Civilians and members of the military interviewed for this report believed the parallel process of civilian advocacy around self-protection and training military forces on POC was effective for achieving protection outcomes in both Banki and Monguno, and the facilitated dialogue process helped to catalyze new engagement from both sides. Respondents also believed the relationship between civilians and the military was improving in both communities, which in turn contributed to improved protection outcomes. While protection challenges remain in both communities, and this approach should not be construed as a panacea, there is ample evidence that the civil-military relationship can enable improved POC.

For example, because of CPC advocacy, military commanders provided patrols to protect civilians from AOG attacks, ensured that sentry posts were manned, prevented soldiers from entering areas previously blocked.

3. The government of Nigeria’s, and the international community’s, training of Nigerian security forces should emphasize POC, including CHM, leveraging experiential, role-playing exercises that build trainees’ understanding of the difficult choices civilians must make in conflict environments. This can help to overcome individual preconceptions and further humanize the experiences of all civilians within a diverse country like Nigeria. In addition, the Nigerian military should prioritize community engagement training and exercises to help mitigate the potential for civilian harm, recognizing that perceptions of the military are colored by civilians’ memories of past performance.

4. Due to the regular redeployment of security forces within the northeast, and between the current divisional structure of Nigeria’s military, it is essential that training for deployed forces be regular and consistent to reinforce the protection of civilians. Trainings should also target officers/soldiers that have direct contact with civilians, which extends far beyond training for civil-military coordination officers. Likewise, given the frequent military rotations, organizations should introduce community groups and their activities to military personnel on a recurring basis at multiple levels of command so they always have access to report protection threats.

5. In many areas, security forces (primarily the military) are now de facto responsible for local government in the absence of elected political leaders.
   a) It is critical that security forces take reports of violations seriously and are transparent with their accountability mechanisms.
   b) It is likewise critical that security forces report on potential civilian harm resulting from their operations and activities, and offer acknowledgement or amends for such instances.
   c) Lastly, civilians need to be made aware of the appropriate channels for reporting potential violations and civilian harm, encouraged to report potential violations, and protected from any retaliation by accused individuals or units.

The government of Nigeria’s and the international donor community’s interventions intended to improve civil-military relations should consider the subject from the perspectives of both civilians and security forces, although the Government of Nigeria alone has a legal obligation to protect all civilians. Such interventions should be done with a “Do No Harm” approach – if civilians’ grievances toward the military remain unaddressed or civilians risk being targeted by AOGs as a result of perceived affiliation with the government, it may do more harm than good to bring the two groups together.

II. BACKGROUND
The conflict in northeast Nigeria between the Nigerian state and Boko Haram is widely understood to have begun in 2009, with the original AOG known as Boko Haram having now splintered into at least three factions: Jama’atu Ahl al-Sunnah l-l-Hidayat (JASDJ), Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP), and Ansaru. JASDJ and ISWAP operate across portions of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, in addition to Nigeria; Ansaru’s current status is debated, and their influence is significantly less prolific than the other two, characterized by periods where the group appears to be dormant. In the early stages of the conflict, state security forces did little to distinguish between civilians and armed actors, resulting in widespread human rights abuses and civilian harm during operations to suppress the growing insurgency. This resulted in civilians significantly resenting both state and non-state security forces (e.g. civilian security forces). Many political and military leaders have since recognized how the conduct of security forces toward civilians can either aid or undermine their efforts to defeat AOG groups. Understanding the strategic value of protection must be translated into operational planning and execution, and further instilled in the
enlisted soldiers and field commanders deploying to the northeast.

For this brief, CIVIC explored the impact of community advocacy with security forces on protection issues—informed by both community-based protection (CBP) activities and military training on POC— in the towns of Monguno and Banki. Monguno town is the headquarters for Monguno Local Government Area (LGA), approximately 133 kilometers north-east of Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state. The Lake Chad area cuts across several of Borno state’s northern LGAs, including Monguno, as does Nigeria’s border with Chad.1 The town of Banki is located in Bama LGA, about 133 kilometers south-east of Maiduguri, and sits less than a kilometer from Nigeria’s border with Cameroon.1

Both Banki and Monguno were overrun by Boko Haram in the early stages of the conflict. Monguno was retaken by the Nigerian military in February 2015 and has since hosted the headquarters of Sector 3 Command—covering northern parts of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states. Banki was recaptured by the military in September 2015 and currently hosts a military base and internally displaced persons (IDP) camp, with most of the original community either having fled to other parts of Borno or now living within the camp. These towns are most commonly referred to as “garrison towns,” many of which are now surrounded by a secure perimeter of trenches and defensive positions with controlled entry inside the protected ring. From 2015 until 2019, the military maintained a wide presence across Borno state, until regular attacks by AOGs prompted the concentration of forces into larger “Super Camps” in key garrison towns to reinforce positions in headquarter towns or along major routes. As a result of concentrating forces to specific areas, the overall number of outposts across the state was reduced.

For a good portion of 2019 and much of 2020, Monguno has been a frontline community, often caught between ISWAP and JASDJ as they compete against one another for control of territory and resources. Banki is in JASDJ’s current area of influence and protected by elements of the Nigerian military’s 7 Division.12

III. METHODOLOGY

CIVIC first began providing POC and CHM training to state security personnel enrolled in military training institutions and deployed to the northeast in 2018, soon followed by similar training to civilian security forces. Training improves understanding of key POC concepts, and encourages security actors to prioritize the mitigation of civilian harm from their own operations toward armed AOGs. CIVIC’s support to community-based CPCs contributed to ongoing efforts by the community to advocate for their own protection, with the committees serving as a link between the community and security forces operating in the area. This brief explores the impact of civilians’ advocacy efforts on protection issues, including through improved civil-military relations.

We interviewed 30 civilians (24 of whom were members of CPCs and six who were not) and 11 members of the Nigerian military. All civilian interviews were conducted in March 2020, along with some members of the military. Our team conducted a second round of interviews in September 2020 once COVID-19 restrictions eased. This report also draws upon analysis from CIVIC’s internal activities. Names and other personal information have been withheld for the safety of the interviewees, however the interviewees’ status as a civilian or member of the military and their location are provided for additional context where possible.

IV. Protection Threats Prior to Community Advocacy and Civil-Military Engagement

CIVIC asked respondents about the civilian protection challenges in Monguno and Banki in early 2019, prior to CPC engagement with the military on protection issues.

AOG Attacks:

 Civilians in Banki specifically claimed that the military would sometimes abandon their sentry posts along the edges of the community at night allowing AOG members to infiltrate the community, attack civilians, and steal food items.14 15 Although the establishment of the garrison town was an improvement compared to before, civilians continued to fear AOG attacks.16

Intimidation, Harassment, and Physical Assault by Security Forces:

 Civilians reported they were regularly intimidated, physically assaulted, extorted, and had their property stolen or seized by security forces. They also complained about the frequency with which security forces were careless with their weapons, often shooting indiscriminately and sporadically into the air. Civilians described unprovoked physical assaults of young men who security forces believed might have been sympathizers or members of AOGs17 and civilians returning from their farms or collecting firewood were accused of consorting with AOGs while outside the trenches and subjected to harsh interrogation, threats, and physical violence.18 The military was also responsible for checkpoints on roads connecting area towns, and at these checkpoints or while on patrol they would demand civilians pay bribes before they could pass through. Within the garrison towns the military and community militias supporting security efforts would sometimes abuse their position for personal gain. “When food items were distributed to us, it was sometimes seized by military. In some cases, you will see personnel of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) pursue a truck carrying food stuff, and when they catch up with them, they will use their knife to tear open the bag and forcefully take the food they want. And no one can challenge them.”19

Sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA):

 Civilians claimed the military, CJTF and other militias, and police regularly engaged in practices of sexual exploitation and abuse.20 Rape by security forces was reported as common.21 A civilian described her community’s horrific
experience: “Women were forcefully taken away, raped, and impregnated, and there was nothing we could do.”22 Other respondents confirmed that security forces would enter civilian homes, remove the women and subsequently abuse them.23 Respondents also noted that security forces were frequent patrons of women who had resorted to prostitution as a coping strategy once other economic opportunities were no longer available.24

“Before CIVIC came and taught us about our rights there were many challenges. We were afraid to report what happened in the community. We were afraid of harassment from the military and the military was also afraid of the community because they suspected there were insurgents who could harm them among the community.”

- CIVIC interview with CPC member in Banki

Lack of accountability:

Given the abusive practices, civilians resented and feared security forces.25 Civilians said they had few avenues for seeking justice for the wrongs they suffered. Some reported to the police while others appealed to the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA)26 and traditional leaders, but with few results. In many areas the appropriate mechanism for reporting violations and abuses simply did not function any longer, with local governance left to the military because local officials had fled before the area was secured. Without reliable options, many civilians simply adopted a culture of silence27 because they could not talk about these problems in public. Those who attempted to report an abuse were sometimes beaten by the civilian security forces operating alongside the military.28 Civilians were scared of the military and CJTF and felt powerless.29 One man said, “due to ignorance and illiteracy we did not know what to do and how to report.”30 In addition to being physically isolated within garrison towns, often unable to travel from their town to another, mobile phone networks across the northeast are unreliable. Even if civilians had the contact for someone outside their immediate area who could help them, there was no guarantee they would be able to reach them on the phone.

V. Fostering Civil-Military Relations to Advance POC

Traditionally, civilians do not engage directly with the military due to many of the reasons described above, or because of local custom – traditional, political, or religious leaders would ordinarily perform this role on behalf of the community. However, many of these leaders no longer reside in their communities for fear of being targeted by AOGs, so though civilians have issues they need to address with security forces, they often have no way of doing so. CIVIC’s goal was to support communities to catalyze a new and productive exchange between themselves and security forces to address protection concerns.

To support civilian advocacy efforts on protection, CIVIC formed local community protection groups known as CPCs in both Monguno and Banki in 2019.31 Each CPC has 50 members, co-led by one woman and one man, and began with equal numbers of men and women, with further emphasis on the inclusion of youth, persons with disabilities, IDPs, and a diversity of religious and ethnic backgrounds among members.32 33 The diversity of participants is critical to the success of the CPC as it maximizes the opportunity that all relevant protection issues can be raised and discussed in an impartial manner.

The role of the CPC is to engage in outreach to the wider community and track, monitor, discuss, and take action on protection concerns.34 CIVIC educates the committees to understand their rights under international humanitarian law (IHL) and relevant human rights law, and how to assess protection threats to their community. The CPC then develops plans to mitigate the threats, which can be focused on ways individuals or the community can prevent or mitigate civilian harm directly, while also raising protection concerns with relevant security forces.35 CIVIC staff then remain a resource for the community throughout the lifetime of the project, providing guidance, facilitation, linkage to relevant authorities, and support in identifying risks as well as developing mitigation plans.36

CIVIC’s POC and CHM training for deployed security personnel in Banki and Monguno began in May and July 2019.37 Participants from the formal security services are typically members of the Nigerian Army, assigned to units with the Army’s 7 Division or Sector 3 under Theatre Command, but can include officers from the Nigeria Police Force, Nigeria Customs Service, Nigeria Immigration Service, and Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, who are also assigned to a local post. CIVIC staff present material on the protection of civilians, international humanitarian and human rights law, CHM, and amends38 through interactive discussions and scenario-based exercises to frame the concepts within the context of the conflict in northeast Nigeria. This type of training helps participants better understand their obligations to civilians and how their operations are often experienced by civilians.

Once the CPC and security forces are ready, they hold a dialogue to discuss the civilian protection concerns and local civil-military relations. The first civil-military dialogue in Monguno was held in October 2019 between members of the CPC, the local civil-military relations officer, and non-commissioned officers responsible for intelligence and military police. For the first time civilians in Monguno had access to military officers to explain their concerns and ask the military officers for a response. The dialogue was pivotal in improving the civil-military relationship in Monguno because it persuaded the local security forces to act in response to civilian protection concerns, and as such was a first step toward improving protection outcomes in the community.39 In contrast, organizing a dialogue in Banki was challenging because of the persistently high degree of mistrust between civilians and the military. As a result, CIVIC made individual introductions between...
Key outcomes were as follows:

Monguno

- Military Protection from AOG Attacks: Civilians frequently suffered attacks from AOGs when they left the secured perimeter of the garrison town to farm or collect firewood. As a result of the CPC’s advocacy with security forces, the military agreed to provide regular escorts for civilians to visit their farms to work during the day or collect supplies. As one respondent put it, “The army goes into the bush now to patrol, now it is safe, the violations [by AOGs] are limited now.”
- Consistent Manning of Checkpoints to Prevent AOG Attacks: Soldiers would regularly abandon their posts at night leaving the IDP camp near the perimeter of the town adjacent to the military’s trenches vulnerable to AOG attacks. The CPC conducted sustained advocacy to the military to report cases of posts being unattended and local civilians now report that soldiers remain at their posts throughout the night, bringing about a significant reduction in AOG incursions into the IDP camp. One local woman described the influence of the CPC: “When I realize there is no military protection and the army are not in their trenches, I report this to the CPC and the army ensures the military goes to their trenches to protect us.”

Banki

- Military Intervention to Mitigate SEA: IDPs similarly reported the regular sexual harassment and exploitation of women and girls by soldiers tasked with protecting the IDP camp. CPC members educated IDPs on their rights and how to report these issues. The CPC also reported the pattern to the military, and as a result soldiers are no longer allowed within the IDP camp except with explicit permission from a superior.

VI. Civilian and Military Perspectives on Engagement for POC

Civilians underscored how their advocacy and the military’s response have improved the situation on the ground. Although some tensions undoubtedly remain, one respondent in Banki said, “Now there is no bad relationship between the military and the civilians.” According to civilian respondents, the protection issues present at the time the CPCs were formed have improved, leading one respondent to say, “Now everything has improved we do not act like we did before. Before we used to leave everything to God. But now the situation has improved, we have access to report every situation, we know our rights in the community.”

“I feel very confident to report everything, because I am a member of the protection committee.”

- CIVIC interview with CPC member

Feedback from the military has been largely positive; eight of the eleven military personnel interviewed for this report stated that they were now more aware of POC principles, with a better understanding of civilian perspectives on the conflict. All said they desired improved relationships with civilians. For those who had not attended not attended POC trainings they suggested that the trainings be targeted at soldiers who are in direct contact with civilians, understood to mean those soldiers assigned to the garrison towns rather than those with operational responsibilities outside the towns.

For the military, improved trust and information sharing is one of the most noteworthy outcomes of the improved relationship with civilians. Civilians report feeling more secure when approaching the military and appreciate the access they have to the local military and CJTF commanders. In turn, civilians’ confidence and willingness to report threats or concerns assuages military fears that civilians are hostile to the military or collaborating with the AOGs. As one member of the security services stated, “We need them [civilians] seriously because they are the ones that move around. They move around, they go to their farms, they go to fetch firewood, they go to fetch water, they come back, whatever they see, they come back and tell us.” Another military member said, “It is not an option to maintain good relations with the local community...they need us, we need them, as a matter of fact, we need them more in a way.”

VII. Conclusion

Improving POC through addressing civil-military relations between local communities and the security forces deployed to northeast Nigeria is a critical component of resolving the conflict. One factor inspiring many recruits to join Boko Haram in the late 2000’s was the history of abuse toward civilians by Nigeria’s security forces, and the resulting alienation of civilians from their government. Of course, AOGs have since caused incalculable harm of their own, with civilians once again bearing the brunt of it. By enabling civilians and the military to constructively engage one another, enduring protection outcomes can be achieved. A year into this process in Monguno and Banki, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that improved civil-military relations that lead to improved outcomes for civilians is indeed possible when civilians are empowered to advocate for their own protection and security forces take deliberate action to respect civilian calls.

Civilians living in Monguno and Banki will continue to be at risk from both persistent and emerging security threats that require constant vigilance from all stakeholders, but as a CPC member from Banki said, “We did not feel free before now but now we are free.” He continued, “knowing our rights, gave us full confidence.” Addressing protection concerns of civilians will require sustained efforts by civilian groups, and, most importantly, the Government of Nigeria and its security forces to be accountable to international and Nigerian laws as well as intentional in their engagement of civilian populations.
1. Often termed incidental harm by armed forces.
2. CIVIC defines POC as, “All efforts taken to protect civilians from conflict related harm.” POC includes efforts that actors take to protect civilians from attacks by third parties as well as efforts security forces take to mitigate harm to civilians as a result of their presence, activities and operations, also known as civilian harm mitigation (CHM).
3. CIVIC defines civilian harm mitigation as, “Those measures taken by armed actors to prevent, minimize and address civilian harm resulting from their own presence, activities, and operations.”
4. Local residents continue to refer to all three interchangeably as Boko Haram.
5. CIVIC defines civilian harm as, “conflict-related death, physical and psychological injury, loss of property and livelihood, interruption of access to essential services.”
6. CIVIC first published research on patterns of civilian harm in northeast Nigeria in 2015. See “When We Can’t See the Enemy; Civilians Become the Enemy”: Living Through Nigeria’s Six-Year Insurgency. Available via CIVIC’s website, https://civicsincrisisconflict.org/publications/research/living-nigerias-six-year-insurgency/. Of one the principal findings was that patterns of abuse civilians suffered at the hands of the military.
7. Security forces is a blanket term used in this report to refer to the military and community-based militias or security forces, such as the Civilian Joint Task Force. Where emphasis needs to be placed on one group, the group will be explicitly stated. The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) is the most recognized of several community-based militia groups that formed in response to the conflict and have since assumed a quasi-official status operating alongside government forces. See CIVIC’s April 2020 protection brief, To Defend or Harm for more information on the CJTF and other community-militia groups operating in northeast Nigeria.
8. See Melissa Dalton, “Conduct Is the Key: Improving Civilian Protection in Nigeria,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, accessed July 20, 2020 https://www.csis.org/analysis/conduct-key-improving-civilian-protection-nigeria. Much research has shown how abusive state practices toward civilians increases the risks that they will join AOGs. UNDP’s comprehensive study of armed opposition group fighters (which included a sample heavily drawn from Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram) found that 71 percent identified ‘government action,’ including ‘killing of a family member or friend’ and ‘arrest of a family member or friend,’ as the main reason they chose to join the group, UNDP, Journey to Extremism in Africa, 2017. https://journey-to-extremism.undp.org/content/downloads/UNDP_JourneyToExtremism-report-2017-english.pdf.
9. CIVIC defines CBP as, “Engagement and activities that put civilians and communities at the center of protection of civilians’ efforts and aim at strengthening their resilience against conflict-related harm or threat of harm.”
12. CIVIC’s internal LGA assessment.
17. CIVIC interviews with civilians in Monguno, March 2020.
20. CIVIC interviews with civilians in Monguno, March 2020.
26. SEMA is responsible for the coordination of resources and activities in response to, and management of, disasters or conflict. Typically. SEMA is in charge of IDP camps and civilians do, at times, report problems faced in the camp to SEMA officials.
27. CIVIC interviews in Banki and Monguno, March 2020.
29. CIVIC interviews with civilians in Banki and Monguno, March 2020.
31. CIVIC currently supports civilians to advocate for improved POC as well as training for the military in 41 communities across Bama, Damboa, Dikwa, Monguno, Gwoza, Konduga, Jere, and MMC LGAs of Borno State. CIVIC selected CPC members for all locations in which we work except in Damboa, where CIVIC transitioned a similar community-based group previously supported by OXFAM into the CPC once the OXFAM program ended. CIVIC’s choice of Banki and Monguno for this brief was based on CIVIC’s initial assessment of both CPCs and their associated engagement with security forces. The Monguno CPC was assessed to be the most established and proactive while the Banki CPC was perceived to have challenges.
32. CPC and community members interviewed for this brief were supportive of the process for selecting CPC members because all ethnic, religious, and age groups are represented, as well as both genders. Therefore, they saw the selection process as impartial. The CPCs were commended by community members for having good relationships with the community and the military and not discriminating between community members. Of note, all members of the protection committees are volunteers and are not compensated for participation.
33. CIVIC provided the CPC members with reflective vests at their request, to formally designate members of the CPC. According to respondents, the vest commands respect from civilians and security forces. As the security situation improved in some communities the lack of economic opportunities became more apparent, and more of an immediate concern to community members. This was often reflected in the discussions of CPC members during CIVIC-supported meetings, but in many communities the security situation still does not allow for full-time farming or inter-communal trading. Borno state was lagging behind most other states in terms of economic development before the conflict began, and it will likely take many years before local economies rebound to pre-2009 levels.
34. As part of the initial formation of a CPC, CIVIC frames the role of a CPC as taking action in response to threats of physical violence against community members. Communities often identify other sources of insecurity which they might take on as a group, but CIVIC’s support remains focused on threats of physical violence.
35. CIVIC documents each plan formulated during CIVIC events in a running results journal.
36. CIVIC staff facilitated five meetings of the Monguno CPC between May 2019 and April 2020, and four times in Banki – although with a significant gap between the first and second meeting in Banki due to security and logistical challenges.
37. At the time of data collection for this report, CIVIC had conducted three training workshops in each location.
38. CIVIC defines amends as, “The practice of armed actors recognizing and/or providing assistance to civilians that they harmed within the lawful parameters of their presence, activities, and operations.”
39. CIVIC interviews with civilians in Monguno, March 2020. Also see protection outcomes below.
40. CIVIC staff maintain a results journal updated after each CPC meeting to record the concerns discussed, the action plans drafted, and any follow-up or outcome from past action plans. Monguno’s CPC created five action plans, and Banki created six.
42. CIVIC interview with AA, September 2020.
43. CIVIC interviews with civilians in Monguno, March 2020.
44. CIVIC interviews with civilians in Monguno, March 2020.
45. CIVIC interviews with civilians in Monguno, March 2020.
46. CIVIC interviews with civilians in Monguno, March 2020.
47. CIVIC interview with K, March 2020.
50. CIVIC interviews with military personnel in Banki and Monguno.
51. CIVIC interviews with military personnel in Monguno.
52. CIVIC interview with U, March 2020.

---

ENDNOTES

Cover Image: CIVIC staff with CPC members in Monguno March 2020
CIVIC Photo
RECOGNIZE. PREVENT. PROTECT. AMEND.

Military officer stopping a civilian tricycle at a check point, December 2019. The Walking Paradox