CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE

The impact of security and political fragmentation on civilian protection in Sinjar
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Ruins of a destroyed building in Sinjar’s old city, February 2020. Roman records indicate Sinjar city has been inhabited since before 114 CE. Before the war against ISIS destroyed most of the city, the old town had architectural legacies from different eras, including Roman walls, Catholic and Assyrian churches, vestiges from Ottoman buildings, and mosques and Yazidi shrines.
ABOUT CENTER FOR CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT

Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC) is an international organization dedicated to promoting the protection of civilians caught in conflict. CIVIC’s mission is to work with armed actors and civilians in conflict to develop and implement solutions to prevent, mitigate, and respond to civilian harm. Our vision is a world where parties to armed conflict recognize the dignity and rights of civilians, prevent civilian harm, protect civilians caught in conflict, and amend harm.

CIVIC was established in 2003 by Marla Ruzicka, a young humanitarian who advocated on behalf of civilian war victims and their families in Iraq and Afghanistan. Building on her extraordinary legacy, CIVIC now operates in conflict zones throughout the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and South Asia to advance a higher standard of protection for civilians.

At CIVIC, we believe that parties to armed conflict have a responsibility to prevent and address civilian harm. To accomplish this, we assess the causes of civilian harm in particular conflicts, craft practical solutions to address that harm, and advocate the adoption of new policies and practices that lead to the improved wellbeing of civilians caught in conflict. Recognizing the power of collaboration, we engage with civilians, governments, militaries, and international and regional institutions to identify and institutionalize strengthened protections for civilians in conflict.

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The civilians with whom CIVIC spoke have suffered immeasurably during the armed conflict and years of insecurity. We greatly appreciate their willingness to speak to us. CIVIC takes seriously our responsibility to ensure their words are translated into policies and practices that address their protection concerns.

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# Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CFs</td>
<td>Coalition Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHM</td>
<td>Civilian Harm Mitigation</td>
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<td>CPG</td>
<td>Community Protection Group</td>
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<td>DMA</td>
<td>Directorate of Mine Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERW</td>
<td>Explosive Remnant of War</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOI</td>
<td>Government of Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>HPE</td>
<td>Hêza Parastina Ézîdxanê (translated as the Ezidkhan Defense Units, Ezidkhan Protection Force, or Protection Force of Ezidkhan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISF</td>
<td>Iraqi Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, also known as Daesh</td>
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<tr>
<td>KDP</td>
<td>Kurdistan Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>KRG</td>
<td>Kurdish Regional Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>KRI</td>
<td>Kurdistan Region of Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOP</td>
<td>Ministry of Peshmerga</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMU</td>
<td>Popular Mobilization Unit, also known as al-Hashd al-Shaabi.</td>
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<tr>
<td>POC</td>
<td>Protection of Civilians</td>
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<tr>
<td>PUK</td>
<td>Patriotic Union of Kurdistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>Syrian Democratic Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YBS</td>
<td>Yekîneyên Berxwedana Şengalê (translated as Sinjar Protection Units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YPG/YPJ</td>
<td>Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (translated as People’s Protection Units) and Yekîneyên Parastina Jin (translated as Women’s Protection Units)</td>
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The fight against ISIS in Sinjar left the old city completely destroyed and contaminated with unexploded ordnances. To this date, its residents have not been able to return home, February 2020.
Executive Summary

*Sinjar is the neglected child of Iraq. Nobody takes care or pay[s] attention [to it].”*

- Commander of a local Yazidi PMU, Sinjar city, February 2020.

In August 2014, the Islamic State (also known as ISIS, or Daesh in Arabic) unleashed a genocidal campaign in the Yazidi-majority district of Sinjar, Iraq. Targeting Yazidis, ISIS fighters destroyed villages, killed over 3,000 people, kidnapped over 6,400 more, enslaved women and children, subjecting them to torture and other abuses, including sexual abuse, and demanded Yazidis convert to Islam. They also targeted Shia and Sunni Kurds, and Sunni Arabs who did not comply with ISIS goals and ideology. These violent attacks caused a humanitarian crisis that ultimately resulted in over 200,000 people fleeing the area.

While ISIS was dislodged from Sinjar in 2017, the return of those who fled has been hindered by the district’s disputed status between the Government of Iraq (GOI) and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Returns have also been stymied by the presence of a myriad of armed actors with disparate chains of command, widespread contamination by explosive remnants of war (ERWs) and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and the lack of local officials available to approve reconstruction and provide medical and educational services.

This report analyzes the protection threats affecting civilians in Sinjar and the internally displaced persons (IDPs) who are unable to return to the area. It assesses how the fragmented security landscape and the dispute between the GOI and the KRG is impacting civilians’ lives, as well as how the lack of access to justice and compensation is undermining reconciliation efforts and creating an environment where revenge is sought.

Located in northwest Iraq, the Sinjar region has historically been a place of trade and cultural exchange, home to multiple ethnic and religious communities, including Yazidis, Sunni Arabs, Sunni and Shia Kurds, Christians, and Turkmen. However, this coexistence has suffered greatly from the conflict with ISIS. At present, Sinjar has one of the lowest rates of IDP returns amongst conflict-affected areas in Iraq. Three years after the area was completely retaken from ISIS by GOI forces, approximately 77 percent of the original population of Sinjar and neighboring Al-Baaj remain unable to return home. Reasons for the slow returns include the severity of destruction to infrastructure, farmland, and homes, the lack of livelihood opportunities, and the area’s explosive ordnance contamination, compounded with people's perceptions of insecurity and the trauma experienced as a result of ISIS attacks. Reticence to return is also influenced by IDPs’ ethnicity, religion, and political affiliation.

The region’s security landscape remains fragmented, in large part due to the presence of multiple pro-government armed actors who participated in the different phases of military operations against ISIS in Sinjar. As of the writing of this report, over ten different security actors are operating in an area of approximately 2,000 square miles, each with competing goals and interests. There is poor coordination and intelligence-sharing between forces, which creates gaps in security when it comes to ISIS-affiliated attacks and criminal behaviors that threaten civilians. Some security actors have
themselves been involved in harassing and extorting the civilian population, and reports suggest they have also been involved in attacks against Sunni Arabs. Notably, the lack of women in the security forces in Sinjar—only the Sinjar Defense Units (Yekîneyên Berxwedana Şengalê, YBS) have women among their ranks—leaves women vulnerable to harassment. In addition, tensions between different armed actors have resulted in verbal and physical confrontations, which pose a danger to civilians in the vicinity of incidents, further deepening the sense of instability in Sinjar, and heightening the population’s distrust of security actors.

Due to its strategic location bordering Syria and Turkey in northern Iraq, Sinjar is geopolitically important and vulnerable to external intervention. Turkey, for example, has launched airstrikes against groups affiliated with the People’s Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, YPG) of Syria, which Turkey accuses of maintaining links to the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and of being a terrorist actor. These attacks have impacted civilians and their property in Sinjar, both deterring returns and undermining stability.

Meanwhile, tensions between the GOI and the KRG for control of Sinjar are severely affecting the region’s reconstruction and the reestablishment of services, as well as the return of essential government workers to the area. After the KRG held a referendum on Kurdish independence in October 2017, the Peshmerga and other local officials affiliated with the main Kurdish political parties withdrew from Sinjar, leaving a vacuum that was filled by different Popular Mobilization Units (PMU). These included Yazidi-only forces from the area, Shia-dominated groups from other parts of Iraq, the Sinjar Defense Units—affiliated with the YPG—and Iraqi Security Forces (army and police). A new administration was appointed by the PMU in Sinjar city, but it lacks formal recognition by the GOI and Nineveh authorities. Instead, former local officials have set up a parallel administration which is run out of Dohuk in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). This dual administration is impacting approvals for restoration of services, rebuilding of essential infrastructure, and hiring staff to run schools and health centers. Some government offices in Sinjar remain closed or understaffed as well, creating additional burdens on a population that often travels long distances to the KRI in order to obtain government approvals and civil documents.

In addition to these challenges, civilians wishing to return to Sinjar are deterred, as Sinjar remains a heavily mined area due to the ERWs left by the conflict and IEDs that ISIS planted in buildings as they withdrew. Bureaucratic obstacles to approve the clearance of ERWs and IEDs, the lack of adherence to international mine clearance standards by Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and YBS, and the slow pace of mine clearance continue to hinder the region’s reconstruction process and the restoration of services in the area.

Since June 2020, the COVID-19 crisis and public-health related movement restrictions imposed by Erbil and Baghdad have caused a sharp increase in the number of IDPs returning to Sinjar, including to some of the most devastated areas in Al-Qahtaniya and Qaeyrrawan subdistricts. This is added pressure on the already limited services in the area. Furthermore, some families have not been able to return to their own houses, as they have been occupied by armed actors or by families who returned to the area and moved into empty homes because their own had been destroyed. Coupled with many inhabitants’ lack of property titles, this pattern will likely increase housing and land disputes, and contribute to general tensions in the multi-ethnic and religious district.

Indeed, social cohesion among different ethnic and religious groups has deteriorated in Sinjar. While some Sunni Muslims from the area did participate in ISIS’s attacks against neighboring Yazidi
communities, all Sunni Arabs—and to some extent Sunni Kurds—are collectively blamed by Yazidis for joining ISIS. Many Yazidis told CIVIC that they will never be able to live in peace with their Arab neighbors and do not want them to return to the area. As of this report’s publication, many Sunni Arabs and Kurds remained displaced across the country, fearing retaliation from Yazidi armed groups and the Yazidi community if they attempt to come back to their hometowns. Sunni Arabs who have returned to their villages are harassed by local armed actors and live in isolation.

Efforts to bring the perpetrators to justice are slow and face numerous obstacles. Until the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh (UNITAD) became involved in 2018, little had been done by government authorities to exhume bodies, protect sites for evidence, or investigate. In addition, trials for ISIS suspects, including those related to attacks against Yazidis, are held under the Iraqi anti-terrorist law No. 13 (2005), rather than according to the specific crimes committed (e.g., murder, kidnapping, sexual violence, or slavery). The process is thus failing to provide justice for the community as a collective. Furthermore, while compensation for victims of terrorism and armed conflict is allowed under Iraqi Law No. 20 (2009), the bureaucratic hurdles are enormous. The absence of a Sub-Committee Compensation Office in Sinjar and the lack of sufficient government resources to pay compensation claims pose a significant challenge. The loss of property titles and evidence during the flight from Sinjar further complicate efforts to obtain compensation.

ISIS attacks devastated Sinjar, causing widespread destruction and tearing apart the social fabric between different ethnic and religious communities. While it will take time to address the current social tensions, reconciliation issues, and collective trauma of some communities like the Yazidis, both the GOI and the KRG must take all the necessary steps to ease the suffering of the Sinjar population. They have the responsibility to assist in reconstruction efforts, remove bureaucratic obstacles to reestablishing services, encourage the return of government employees, expedite the clearance of ERWs and IEDs, and create opportunities for Sinjaris to earn a livelihood.

Moreover, the GOI, the Nineveh authorities, and the KRG must take the necessary steps to improve the security situation in Sinjar and make local forces accountable to the people they serve. In 2019, the Nineveh Provincial Council passed a protection of civilians (POC) policy committing the local government and security forces to respect rights, train and act from a POC lens, and improve access to compensation. Such policy commitments must be implemented throughout Nineveh Governorate, including in Sinjar, where they can contribute to improving stabilization efforts, ease the suffering of Sinjaris, and help them rebuild their lives and communities. The GOI also needs to ensure there is justice for the victims of ISIS attacks in Sinjar by prosecuting those involved and providing reparations for victims.

After decades of marginalization and neglect from the central government, Sinjaris now face deep trauma in the aftermath of the 2014 ISIS attacks. They continue to suffer terrible consequences from the attacks themselves, as well as from the military operations to dislodge ISIS and the ongoing regional and national disputes over territorial control. The GOI and KRG have a duty to address, once and for all, the systematic neglect of Sinjar population. Urgent action is necessary to prevent Sinjar from becoming a battleground for regional and national competition and to provide its inhabitants with the resources and opportunities they need to rebuild their lives and heal their wounds.
Recommendations

To the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government:

- Facilitate the voluntary return of IDPs to Sinjar district, including by effectively reestablishing services, supporting reconstruction efforts, and creating livelihood opportunities, regardless of the authorities and security forces in control.
- Empower the local administration in Sinjar with authority to govern and facilitate residents’ administrative requests.
- Commit Sinjar security forces to participate in scenario-based trainings on protection of civilians, including trainings on community engagement, international humanitarian law (IHL), and international human rights law (IHRL).
- Establish a phased dialogue process between the GOI and the KRG to resolve the current disputes over the administrative and security control of Sinjar district. Include in the dialogues community leaders and political representatives from the area, as well as perspectives from the different ethnic and religious communities in Sinjar, and the voices of women and youth.
- Hasten the clearance of ERWs and IEDs by: improving the application system and speeding the approval process for explosive clearance actors to obtain access permits to the affected areas; improving the coordination between the Iraqi Directorate of Mine Action (DMA), the ISF, and other explosive hazards clearance actors; and ensuring that all clearance actors—including government forces—adhere to international standards regarding explosive clearance.
- Support intra-communal dialogue between the different components of society in Sinjar to address existing grievances, prevent attacks on communities, and ensure peaceful coexistence.
- Promote accountability and justice for the crimes committed against the population in Sinjar and expedite the prosecution of the perpetrators under international fair trial standards.
- Recognize the crimes against the Yazidi population in Sinjar and other parts of Nineveh as acts of genocide and provide reparations to the victims and the community.
- Press Turkey on the lawfulness of attacks in Iraq and urge compensation for those harmed.

To the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI), the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD), the Kurdish Ministry of Peshmerga (MOP), and PMU Committee:

- Ensure all personnel receive scenario-based trainings on protection of civilians, including community engagement.
- Recruit, train, and deploy female police officers to support interaction with civilians and, when necessary, searches of female civilians.
- Ensure the security forces recruit personnel from the area where they are deployed, including men and women from the different ethnic and religious components living in the area.
- Establish a security coordination mechanism that includes all the security forces operating in the area, and ensure that all operations are conducted professionally and from a protection of civilians lens.
To the Nineveh Provincial Government and the local authorities in Sinjar district:

- Formalize a unified mechanism for the population to report complaints about the behavior of security forces without retaliation, managed by local civilian authorities in the district. Publicize its existence, develop policies and allocate resources to investigate incidents and, when appropriate, refer cases for prosecution.
- Implement the protection of civilians policy adopted by the Nineveh Provincial Council in 2019 through concrete measures, including committing local forces to POC trainings and improving access to compensation.
- Advocate to the federal government to allocate funds and resources to Nineveh Governorate to ensure the implementation of Compensation Laws No. 20/2009 and No. 57/2015, as well as to improve the compensation application process to ensure it is accessible, fair, and effective.
- Open an Office of Compensation in Sinjar city and ensure that IDPs can apply from their areas of displacement.

To all security forces present in the area:

- Improve force capacity to assess threats to civilians and respond to them efficiently, working with the community on best approaches to respond to their concerns.
- Engage in regular dialogue with civilians and community leaders—both men and women—and listen to concerns arising from security forces’ misconduct and from tensions between communities. Ensure that engagement with communities is done safely and constructively, and that it does not expose civilians to further risk of harm.
- Ensure that members of the security forces are aware of the different traditions and cultural practices in the areas where they operate and that they behave respectfully with the local population.
- Investigate allegations of misbehavior, harassment, and exploitation by members of each of the security forces. Hold them accountable under the law.
- Vacate civilian houses and compensate their owners for the time they were occupied in the form of rent payments.

To the Government of Turkey:

- The Turkish government must take all feasible precautions to avoid or minimize civilian harm and damage to civilian objects. It should open an impartial and thorough investigation on the lawfulness of attacks and compensate persons for harm.

To the United Nations (UN) and the international community:

- Continue supporting the voluntary and safe return of IDPs to their areas of origin, the reestablishment of services and reconstruction efforts, and the creation of livelihood opportunities in Sinjar district.
Methodology

This policy brief presents CIVIC’s analysis of the protection environment in Sinjar district and in Al-Qahtaniya subdistrict of Al-Baaj district.²

The analysis is based on 93 interviews, observations made while attending the UN-led Protection Cluster meetings, other meetings with humanitarian partners, conferences, and a review of public data and literature. The interviews were conducted between February and June 2020 in the cities of Erbil and Dohuk, as well as in different locations of Sinjar district.³ While most of the interviews were conducted in person, curfews and movement restrictions imposed by both the KRG and the GOI due to the COVID-19 pandemic required CIVIC to conduct some interviews over telephone. The interviews were conducted face to face or by telephone in Arabic, Kurdish, Turkmen, or English (at the discretion of the respondent) and were semi-structured to allow greater flexibility in the data collection.

CIVIC conducted 50 interviews with civilians and community leaders, including tribal and religious leaders, as well as mukhtars (community leaders). CIVIC also conducted 12 interviews with government authorities from Sinjar district and from the Nineveh provincial council. Those interviewed were affiliated with different political parties and included some independent candidates. Of these 62 interviews, 54 were conducted with men and 8 with women. An additional nine interviews were conducted with members of different security forces and armed actors operating in Sinjar district and in the Al-Qahtaniya subdistrict of Al-Baaj district, including members of the Fermanda Ezikhane (led by Qassim Sheso), the Hêza Parastina Êzîdxanê (HPE, led by Haider Shesho), the Yekîneyên Berxwedana Şengalê (YBS) forces, and the Yazidi Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs). CIVIC strives to interview equal numbers of men and women, but female representation in government in Iraq remains low. Moreover, all community leaders (mukhtars and tribal leaders) are men. To compensate for the lack of female representation during the interviews and in order to better capture the female perspective, a Focus Group Discussion (FGD) was organized with six women from the towns of Khanasor and Sinuni in Sinjar district.

This brief also includes 22 interviews and conversations held by CIVIC with staff members from 16 local and international NGOs, UN agencies, and independent researchers.

CIVIC interviewers made the aims of the research clear, and all of the interviewees gave informed consent. For the security and privacy of all interviewees, CIVIC has withheld names and, when necessary, other identifying information.

The complex history, tribal and ethnoreligious makeup, geopolitical significance, and economic importance of Sinjar district—along with the constantly evolving nature of its social and security dynamics—pose a considerable challenge to the current analysis. While this document often analyzes events and civilian perceptions through an ethnoreligious and sometimes tribal lens, CIVIC understands that Sinjar’s residents and internally displaced persons (IDPs) have multi-layered identities and motivations and does not seek to reduce them to their ethnoreligious identities alone.

² Al-Qahtaniya subdistrict was part of Sinjar district and was administratively linked with Sinjar city until the 1970s, when the central government redraw some provincial and district borders as part of the Arabization process. In 1979, Al-Qahtaniya subdistrict was included in Al-Baaj district, and its population had to rely on the administrative institutions in Al-Baaj instead of those of Sinjar city. However, people from Al-Qahtaniya and Sinjar still include this area when they talk about Sinjar. Moreover, maps and reports produced by NGOs and UN agencies often include Al-Qahtaniya as part of Sinjar district (see reference map at start of report). For these reasons, as well as the similarity and relation of the protection issues found, Al-Qahtaniya will be considered here as part of Sinjar district for the sake of simplification. When “Sinjar district” is mentioned in this report, it includes the subdistricts of Al-Shimal (Sinuni), Markaz Sinjar, Al-Gaeryrawan (Bulaaj), and Al-Qahtaniya (Tel Ezer), unless otherwise specified.

³ In Sinjar district, the team conducted interviews in the subdistricts of Sinuni and Markaz Sinjar, in the towns of Sinuni, Khanasor, Dogure, Duhola, Sheferdin Shrine, Sinjar city, and the Sardaste IDP camp.
Background

Located in Nineveh Governorate on the border with Syria and Turkey, Sinjar region has historically been a place of trade and cultural exchange. It is home to Yazidis, Sunni Arabs, Sunni and Shia Kurds, Christians, and Turkmens. However, because it sits in both a strategic location and on a political fault line, it has long been subject to national and regional interference.

Part of the disputed territories, Sinjar district has been claimed by both the Iraqi central government and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) since 2005. After the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and the establishment of a federal democratic system, the security forces of the KRG, the Peshmerga, and the Asayish deployed in Sinjar district alongside the KRG administration.

Yazidis, who make up the majority of the population in Sinjar and are an ethnoreligious minority group in Iraq, have been subjected to years of discrimination and socio-economic marginalization by state actors and by the Ba’ath party’s Arabization policies. In August 2014, ISIS fighters, supported by some local Sunni Arabs, launched a campaign of killings, kidnappings, and forced conversions against Yazidis, taking girls and women as slaves, subjecting them to sexual abuse, and indoctrinating children in ISIS ideology. Peshmerga forces responsible for security in the area abandoned the local population as ISIS advanced. It is estimated that around 3,100 Yazidis were killed during the initial weeks of these attacks, with nearly half of them executed by the attackers and the rest dying during the siege of Sinjar mountain. Official figures state that 6,417 Yazidis, mainly women and children, were kidnapped. The atrocities committed against the Yazidi population have been declared acts of genocide by the KRG, the UN, and several countries.

Yazidis who managed to flee their towns and cities sought refuge in Sinjar mountain, but were

4 Sinjar mountain holds a special place in Yazidi religion and folklore. Protected by its geography against successive campaigns of forced conversion and mass killings, Yazids have sought shelter in the mountain and its terrain. The mountain is sacred to them and seen as a protector of the Yazidi people.

5 According to article 140 of the 2005 Iraqi Constitution, “Kirkuk and other disputed territories” affected by the Ba’athist Arabization campaigns should be allowed a period of “demographic normalization” during which the state would support citizens forcibly displaced by the former regime who wish to return to their original hometowns. This period would be followed by a referendum by which the residents would vote on whether they want their areas to remain part of federal Iraq or join the autonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI).

6 The Peshmerga are the KRG’s military forces, while the Asayish is their internal security, or intelligence. Although the Peshmerga forces are formally under the command of the KRG’s Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs and the Asayish falls under the KRG’s MOI, in practice, both the larger Peshmerga brigades and the members of the Asayish are under direct control of the two main Kurdish political parties: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).

7 Since the 1930s, Sinjar has been subjected to a series of policies of forced displacement and land collectivization that have transformed the region’s culture and economy. Yazidis and other ethno-religious minorities have been the most adversely affected by these policies of demographic engineering and collectivization. Commonly known as “Arabization” (Ta’rib in Arabic), the Ba’ath party in the 1970s destroyed historic Yazidi villages in the mountains and forcibly displaced and relocated Yazidis and Arab nomadic peoples into newly built collectives (mujama’at). UNAMI, “Emerging land tenure issues among displaced Yazidis from Sinjar, Iraq,” November 2015, https://unhabitat.org/node/142208; Eszter Spät, “Yezidi Identity Politics and Political Ambitions in the Wake of the ISIS Attack,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 20, no. 5 (2018): 420–438, https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2018.1406689.


10 According to the KRG Office of Kidnapped and Missing People, an estimated 6,417 Yazidis were kidnapped by ISIS. Of these, 3,530 managed to escape or were rescued, while 2,887 are still missing.

besieged by ISIS until they were rescued by fighters from the YPG and the Women’s Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Jin, in Kurmanji Kurdish, or YPJ), which belong to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) of northeast Syria. Crossing from Syria into Sinjar, the YPG/YPJ fighters opened a corridor to evacuate civilians with aerial support from the US.

ISIS occupation north of Sinjar Mountain did not last long. By the end of 2014, the Peshmerga, the YPG/YPJ, and the Sinjar Defense Units (Yekîneyên Berxwedana Şengalê, YBS) had retaken control of the area and expelled ISIS.

In November 2015, a combination of different security forces took part in the liberation of Sinjar city, aided by anti-ISIS Coalition Forces (CFs) air support. In May 2017, some Iran-backed Shia Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) led by the Kata’ib al-Imam Ali Brigade, together with Yazidi PMU groups and the YBS, initiated military operations against ISIS in areas south of Sinjar Mountain and reclaimed the area.

Most of those fleeing were Yazidi civilians, along with groups of Shia Kurds, Christians, and some Shia Turkmen who had previously fled their homes in Tal Afar district days earlier—just to have to flee again from Sinjar. The Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (YPG) is a Kurdish-led militia formed in 2011 in the context of the Syrian Civil War. Today, it is the larger group within the US-sponsored Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) that were trained and equipped to fight against ISIS in Syria. The Yekîneyên Parastina Jin, (YPJ) is a women-only group fighting alongside the YPG as part of the SDF. Since these groups share similar ideological principles with the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK), which is considered a terrorist organization by Turkey, the Turkish government accuse all these groups of being terrorists.

The Sinjar Defense Units (Yekîneyên Berxwedana Şengalê, YBS) are an all-Yazidi armed actor closely linked to the YPG/YPJ. The group originates from an all-Yazidi armed group called Melek Tawus, which formed in 2007 after Al-Qaeda attacks against Yazidi communities in Sinjar. Initially a small force, it was allegedly sponsored by PKK elements in Syria and Qandil (Iraq). After the 2014 ISIS attacks, the group was rebranded as YBS. Since then, it has substantially increased its numbers and today is one of the main armed actors in Sinjar district. Due to its links to the YPG/YPJ, Turkey also considers the group an extension of the PKK in Sinjar.

The ISIS attacks in 2014 triggered an exodus of nearly 200,000 persons from Sinjar district. Many fled to the KRI or to areas of Nineveh not under ISIS control, while tens of thousands sought refuge on Sinjar Mountain. Almost the entire population of Sinjar district became displaced at some point during the 2014–2017 crisis. The greatest wave of displacement took place during the initial weeks of August 2014, but a second wave of displacement occurred in 2017 during military operations against ISIS. Around 30,000 Sunni Arabs who had lived under ISIS control also fled their homes and became IDPs due to the fighting.

Yazidis harbor feelings of betrayal and anger at their abandonment by the Peshmerga security forces who were meant to protect them and toward the Iraqi government for its inadequate response, as well as toward Sunni Arabs who joined ISIS. Some of the security issues and protection concerns addressed in this paper stem from the Yazidi community’s trauma and mistrust toward Arabs, Sunni Kurds, and the KRI and GOI.

On October 17, 2017, after the KRG referendum on independence (opposed by Baghdad), the ISF and some PMUs advanced toward Sinjar city. They effectively took control of the district, which resulted in the withdrawal of KRG forces. Mahma Khalil, the district’s official mayor, left Sinjar along with the rest of the official administration, most of whom were affiliated with the two main KRG political parties: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The exodus of local authorities left a governmental vacuum in Sinjar, which the GOI and PMUs tried to fill by appointing a new administration. Under tacit agreement with Baghdad, the PMUs appointed Fahad Hamid as the district’s acting mayor, and appointed other government officials as well.

However, at the time of this report’s writing, Fahad Hamid has not been recognized as the official mayor by the GOI or the KRG, and he lacks formal authority to sign official documents or be an official interlocutor with the Nineveh provincial authorities or the Baghdad government. Mahma Khalil, the former mayor, remains the official mayor, and is recognized as such by the GOI and the KRG. As explained below, this dual administration is impacting stabilization efforts and the reestablishment of services.

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16 Most of those trapped in the mountain were evacuated through Syria using a safe corridor opened by the Syrian YPG/YPJ forces between the 9th and the 13th of August. In total, it is estimated that around 125,000 inhabitants of Sinjar district became IDPs in Dohuk Governorate in the KRI. Some of them stayed in IDP camps, while others moved to their relatives’ homes or rented their own houses. Around 13,000 people remained in Syria, mainly in Nowruz IDP camp, and 12,000 fled to Turkey. Finally, 5,000 people remained in the mountain because they were unable or unwilling to leave. See: “Rapid Overview of the Areas of Return (ROAR): Sinjar and surrounding areas,” REACH, May 2018.
17 The initial wave in 2014 included almost all Yazidis, Christians, and Sunni and Shia Kurds from the area, excepting those who were captured or killed by ISIS and those who decided to remain in the mountain after the evacuation corridor was opened. Many Sunni Arabs also fled or fought ISIS.
19 Mahma Khalil, as well as other members of the district’s council and the local administration, attempted to resume their positions in Sinjar in November 2017, but they were confronted by protestors opposing their return and blocking their access to the city. Interviewees have expressed different views regarding who organized and joined the protests. KDP supporters and those in the official administration claimed the protests had been orchestrated by the PKK and the PMUs, while interviewees in Sinjar insisted the protestors represented the Yazidi community in Sinjar, which does not want the former administration back. Source: CIVIC interviews with civilians, members of the official administration currently displaced in Dohuk, and members of the newly appointed administration based in Sinjar, February 2020.
21 CIVIC interview with the acting local government in Sinjar city and the former administration displaced in Dohuk Governorate, February 2020.
It is difficult to estimate the population of Sinjar district before the 2014 crisis due to the lack of recent, accurate censuses in Iraq. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), 308,315 people were living in Sinjar district in 2014, of whom approximately two-thirds were Yazidis. Before the 2014 ISIS offensive, the population in Sinjar was composed of Yazidis, Sunni and Shia Kurds, Sunni Arabs, Christians, and some Turkmen families.

The Yazidis
The Yazidis are a relatively small religious or ethnic minority, indigenous to northern Iraq. Due to the heterodox nature of their faith, Yazidis have often been looked upon with suspicion and persecuted by neighboring communities and rulers. In 2014, ISIS declared Yazidis to be kūffār (infidels), mushrīkin (idolaters), and devil worshippers, therefore legitimizing their murder, enslavement, forced conversion, and other abuses.

Sunni and Shia Kurds
In 2014, Sinjar district was home to a large Muslim Kurdish population. The majority of this population were Sunni Kurds, but there was a considerable Shia Kurdish population as well. The significantly larger Sunni Kurdish population spread throughout the district, while Shia Kurds were fewer and concentrated in Sinjar city and surrounding villages. In 2014, Shia Kurds were targeted by ISIS alongside the Yazidis. In contrast with the Sunni Kurds, whose return has been strongly opposed by the Yazidi population, Shia Kurds began to return to Sinjar city soon after its liberation. Their return has been supported by the Shia PMU forces who took part in the military operations. To this date Shia Kurds who have returned to Sinjar, have formed their own small PMU brigades, which are integrated within a larger PMU group such as the Al-Abbas Combat Division, Kata‘ib Hizbollah, and the Iman al-Hussein brigades. Shia Kurds still living in the KRI have joined the KDP Peshmerga.

Sunni Arabs
By 2014, Sinjar had a considerable Sunni Arab population belonging to different tribes, including the Al-Khawatna, the Al-Mitewit, the Al-Jehesh, and the Al-Shammar. In August 2014, some members of the Sunni Arab community in Sinjar joined the ISIS uprising against the government, as well as their attacks against the Yazidi population. While some Sheikhs and tribesmen pledged alliance to the caliphate and joined the offensive, the Shammar tribe opposed the ISIS uprising and offensive against the Yazidis from the beginning. The Yazidi community holds grudges against the Arab population and have not allowed most Sunni Arabs to return to their areas of origin in Sinjar district. Sunni Arabs, in turn, are afraid of suffering retaliatory attacks by armed groups and Yazidi civilians.
Protection Concerns

Although military operations against ISIS in Sinjar ended in 2017, the conflict-affected area is one of the districts with the lowest return rates of IDPs in Iraq. The widespread destruction of private property and infrastructure, the ongoing dispute for control between the KRG and the GOI, and the presence of numerous armed actors in the area who are unable to ensure safety are just some of the factors contributing to the district’s instability and IDPs’ decision not to return.

As in other areas of Iraq where IDPs are reluctant to return to their hometowns due to protection concerns and lack of services, some areas in Sinjar remain abandoned or with very few inhabitants. Empty areas like this are attractive to insurgents, who can potentially use them as a base for attacks against both civilians and security forces. This pattern, in turn, further amplifies the area’s insecurity and deters IDP returns.

Barriers to Return

As of this writing, Sinjar and Al-Baaj represent two of the districts with the highest number of displaced households and lowest rates of IDP returns in the whole country. Twenty-seven percent of the total IDPs in Iraq come from Sinjar district alone. According to the International Organization of Migration (IOM), 265,518 individuals from Sinjar and 111,426 from Al-Baaj remained displaced as of June 2020. This means that 78 percent and 74 percent of these districts’ displaced populations, respectively, have not returned. Lack of livelihood opportunities, destruction of property, lack of services and infrastructure, and poor perception regarding security forces’ ability to effectively protect and respond to civilian concerns are key factors hindering IDP returns. While some IDPs have decided to resettle in other parts of Nineveh and the KRI, there are still thousands of families living in IDP camps or informal settlements across Nineveh and the KRI. Many live in poverty, unsure of whether to return to Sinjar or not.

Before the crisis, around 85 percent of the population in Sinjar district relied on agriculture, with few business opportunities existing in the area. However, Sinjar’s infrastructure, farmland, and private property were severely damaged during the ISIS occupation and the subsequent military operations to expel it. For example, no building was left intact in the old town of Sinjar city. Furthermore, as in many parts of Iraq, ISIS employed a “scorched earth” strategy in Sinjar, with retreating fighters destroying the area’s landscape and natural resources to prevent the local population from returning. Irrigation canals and wells were sabotaged with oil and rubble, pumps and other farming equipment were robbed or destroyed, orchards were chopped down and ruined, and electricity lines were stolen. This destruction, as well as IED contamination, has made it impossible for many returnees to resume their agricultural activities. Houses were often intentionally destroyed and rigged with IEDs. Overall, approximately 70 percent of houses in Sinjar district were damaged to

References:
32 According to June 2020 figures, approximately 123,888 individuals from Sinjar and 66,030 individuals from Al-Baaj remain displaced in formal IDP camps in the KRI and Nineveh. These estimates do not include those living in informal camps or settlements. See: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix in Iraq, accessed on August 5, 2020, http://iraqdtm.iom.int/Dashboard.
some extent, and the road network was severely affected due to military operations. Government authorities have also not fully restored essential services, such as schools, clinics, and access to water and electricity. As discussed below, ERW contamination is widespread and will take years to clear.

Business entrepreneurship remains a risky investment, as well, given the slow pace of returns, the low population numbers in certain areas, and the lack of demand for products.

Many people do not feel safe to go back. Also, they don’t invest into rebuilding their houses and businesses or in creating new businesses. The fewer the people that come back, the fewer new businesses will activate the economy. There is no regeneration of the economy of Sinjar.

- Civil activist from Sinjar.

Displaced persons’ perceptions of “poor security” in the district also contributes to insecurity, as well as IDPs reluctance to return. IDPs from collectives in Al-Qahtaniya, south of the Sinjar mountains, such as Shiba she Khdir, Tel Ezzer, or Adnaniya, complained to CIVIC about the presence of multiple security actors in their areas of origin and raised concerns that the areas are not sufficiently safe from ISIS infiltration. They expressed skepticism regarding the government’s ability to secure the area and to protect their communities from future attacks. Concerns about weak security are exacerbated by Sinjar’s proximity to the Al-Jazeera desert in Al-Baaj district, which is known to have residual ISIS presence, although their strength and capabilities to organize large-scale operations are estimated to be low. As of this report’s writing, at least three ISIS-related attacks have been initiated from the Al-Jazeera desert since the beginning of 2018.

Some Yazidi IDPs are further deterred from returning as they resent the Sunni Arab population from Al-Baaj and nearby villages who reside close to the Yazidi collectives, as they allegedly supported ISIS attacks against Yazidis in 2014. As discussed in detail in the next section, Sunni Arabs and Kurds have also refrained from returning due to the destruction of their properties, the poor security in the area, and fears of retaliation from the Yazidi community.

Although the conflict left widespread destruction of public and private property across Sinjar, areas north of the mountain experienced comparatively lower levels of destruction since they were retaken from ISIS relatively quickly compared with areas south of the mountain. The shorter occupation of the northern villages by ISIS left notable damage to houses and infrastructure, but

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36 CIVIC interview with staff members of NGOs and international organizations working in the area, April 2020.
37 Civil activist and NGO funder originally from Sinjar, March 2020.
38 CIVIC interviews with IDPs currently displaced in KRI, February and April 2020.
39 CIVIC interviews with IDPs from Al-Qahtaniya and Qaeyrrawan subdistricts currently settled in Sinjar city and Sardaste IDP camp, February 2020.
40 CIVIC interviews with civilians and local authorities currently living in Sinjar city and with staff members of NGOs operating in the district, February and May 2020.
41 In January 2018, alleged ISIS-affiliated groups launched mortar attacks in Al-Qahtaniya subdistrict. In March 2019, it was suspected that ISIS attacked the Sunni tribal PMU of Fursan Albu Meteuti in Qaeyrrawan subdistrict, and in May 2019, it was alleged that ISIS members abducted three men from Tayawna village in Al-Qahtaniya. Source: CIVIC interviews with a Sunni tribal leader from the area and staff members of an NGO monitoring security developments in Nineveh province, February to June 2020.
43 Some Sunni Arabs families from the Shammar tribe returned to their villages close to the Syrian border (Al-Faw, Bir Qassim, Bir Jari, Hasso Beg) soon after the area was liberated. For the Yazidi majority, the Shammar tribe stands apart from the rest of the area’s Arab tribes because of its strong opposition to ISIS.
44 IOM reports that 75 percent of locations in Sinjar district had some degree of residential destruction, with at least 12 locations classified as having severe damage. Source: “Protracted Displacement Study: An in-depth analysis of the main districts of origin,” IOM, April 2019.
lower levels of explosive contamination.\textsuperscript{45} By contrast, areas south of the mountain, including Sinjar city and the subdistricts of Qaeyrrawan and Al-Qahtaniya, experienced a more extended period of ISIS occupation, heavier fighting during the military operations, and the participation of many pro-government forces in the expulsion of ISIS.\textsuperscript{46} While reconstruction efforts are visible north of the mountain—along with the creation of new livelihood opportunities in the form of small businesses and agricultural projects—a greater level of destruction, including ERW and IED contamination, is severely hindering the return of families to the mountain’s south.

The return of IDPs has not been steady or homogenous across the district, and for those who have returned, life is not easy. According to the IOM, most returnees to Sinjar live in locations classified as having high-severity living conditions due to the extent of infrastructure and private property destruction, lack of services, lack of livelihood opportunities, poor security, and issues related to social cohesion.\textsuperscript{47} Still, IDPs started returning to areas north of the mountain after 2015 with the support of international and local organizations. During this initial wave of returns, it was only Yazidi IDPs who returned. Some of these Yazidi families returned to their original hometowns. Those whose home areas were still occupied by ISIS (such as Sinjar city and the subdistricts of Al-Qahtaniya and Qaeyrrawan) decided to resettle in towns in the northern subdistrict of Sinuni (Al-Shimal), taking up residence in relatives’ homes or empty houses belonging to other families.\textsuperscript{48} While many families remained in the KRI, others did resettle in Sinjar city itself, occupying the empty houses of Yazidis, Sunni Kurds, and Sunni Arabs.\textsuperscript{49} Three years later, Yazidi families from areas south of Sinjar Mountain—both those living in Sinjar city and those in the KRI—continued to emphasize the poor security in their areas of origin compared with towns north of the mountain.

Barriers to safe return also stem from delayed payments from the Iraqi Ministry of Migration and Displacement (MOMD), which offers a one-time grant of 1.5 million Iraqi Dinars to each IDP household returning to their areas of origin. In Sinjar, many returnees have been unable to apply for the grant, either because there is no MOMD branch in Sinjar (meaning they must travel to Tal Afar, 31 miles away) or because they lack some of the documents needed to apply. In addition, those who successfully filed an application in 2017 are still waiting, as funds were allocated on a first-come, first-serve basis. Returnees thus have to wait for months and even years for the fund to be replenished so they can receive their approved payments.\textsuperscript{50} Furthermore, families from Al-Qahtaniya subdistrict who have resettled in Markaz Sinjar and Sinuni subdistricts are ineligible to apply. This is because Al-Qahtaniya subdistrict is administratively part of Al-Baaj district, and the MOMD requires IDPs to return to their districts of origin in order to apply for the grant.\textsuperscript{51} Yet many of these families were displaced during the Arabization policies from villages in the mountains and still consider themselves to be from Sinjar, not Al-Baaj.\textsuperscript{52}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{45} CIVIC interview with staff members of NGOs and international organizations, February—June 2020.
\item \textsuperscript{46} International Crisis Group, 2018.
\item \textsuperscript{47} According to IOM, in April 2020, 93.96 percent of the returnees in Sinjar lived in locations classified as high severity (60,828 individuals) and 6.3 percent lived in locations classified as medium severity (4,098 individuals). This is a total of 72,186 individuals living in locations classified as medium or high severity. Of those returnees, 64,392 individuals lived in high- and medium-severity locations classified as such due to the poor livelihood opportunities (18,168 high severity and 46,224 medium severity). 64,638 individuals lived in high- and medium-severity locations related to issues of safety, security, and social cohesion. See: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix Dashboard, \url{http://iraqdtm.iom.int/Dashboard#ReturnIndex}.
\item \textsuperscript{48} CIVIC interviews with NGOs operating in the area and members of the House, Land and Property sub-cluster, February to June 2020. The massive displacement of civilians from Sinjar district and their settlement in areas north of Sinjar Mountain, the KRI, and in other countries as asylum seekers has had a tremendous impact on the demography of Sinjar and Nineveh province. These effects are likely to be permanent.
\item \textsuperscript{49} According to June 2020 figures, approximately 22,182 individuals from Al-Baaj are displaced in Sinjar district. See: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix in Iraq, accessed on August 5, 2020, \url{http://iraqdtm.iom.int/Dashboard}.
\item \textsuperscript{50} CIVIC interviews with staff from NGOs operating in the district, February to April 2020.
\item \textsuperscript{51} CIVIC interviews with staff from NGOs operating in the district, February to April 2020.
\item \textsuperscript{52} “Understanding barriers to return for Eyzidis to Northern Ba’aj,” IOM, March 2020.
\end{itemize}
Although the overall return of IDPs to Sinjar has been slow, the COVID-19 crisis and the subsequent movement restrictions and loss of livelihoods in KRI has pushed many families to return to their hometowns in Sinjar. From the beginning of June 2020 to mid-July, at least 1,694 families (around 10,165 individuals) left their locations of displacement in KRG-controlled territory and moved back to Sinjar district. This return includes families from the collectives of Al-Qahtaniya, which have remained mostly abandoned since the military operations ended in 2017. While some families have been able to resettle in their hometowns in Al-Qahtaniya, hundreds of families whose houses are uninhabitable, however, have had to resettle with relatives or occupy other empty houses in Sinjar city and Sinuni. This pattern of occupation is a growing concern because the return of owners is leading to the emergence of property disputes. Livelihood opportunities and access to services are also a concern, since the rapid influx of returnees is putting a lot of pressure on their already limited availability. The lack of livelihood opportunities, in particular, can put children at risk of child labor.

Six years after ISIS attacked Sinjar, thousands of families remain displaced, unable to return to their hometowns. Approximately 216,816 IDPs from Sinjar and Al-Baqi are still living in formal camp settlements in Nineveh and the KRI. This situation is unsustainable in the long term, particularly given the shift from humanitarian aid to development and the gradual reduction of funding for camp assistance. After enduring persecution, conflict, and marginalization, these families are at risk of being left behind and becoming permanently displaced second-class citizens in Iraq.

The GOI and the KRG, with the support of the international community, need to reestablish basic services in Sinjar, promote the creation of livelihoods, and ensure the area is secure so that those who want to return to their hometowns can rebuild their lives safely. However, Erbil and Baghdad also need to be ready to accommodate families from different ethnic and religious backgrounds who wish to resettle elsewhere in Iraq.

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After enduring persecution, conflict, and marginalization, these families are at risk of being left behind and becoming permanently displaced second-class citizens in Iraq.

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54 According to an initial assessment conducted by an NGO working in the area, only 40 percent of returnees were able to return to their original residences, while the remaining 60 percent had to resettle in other shelters. Around 82 percent of returnees are said to have returned permanently, while the rest remain unsure whether they will stay or leave again. Source: “Returnees Initial Needs Assessment,” conducted in June 2020 by an international NGO and presented at the Returns Working Group meeting in July 2020.
55 As of mid-July, around 350 families had not been able to returned to their own houses in their hometowns, and had to settle temporarily with relatives or occupying other houses in Markaz Sinjar or Sinuni subdistricts. Source: Return Working group meeting, July 2020.
56 Approximately 32 percent of new returnees reported not having access to any sort of livelihood opportunities, 48 percent reported having access to a source of income covering just 25 percent of their needs, and 60 percent of the retuning population reported having problems covering their food needs. See “Returnees Initial Needs Assessment,” July 2020.
57 Thirty-three percent of returnees indicated that the lack of household livelihood will force them to put their children to work. “Returnees Initial Needs Assessment,” July 2020.
POLITICIZATION OF THE RETURN OF IDPS

Interviewees in Sinjar blamed the KRG authorities for creating obstacles to the return of Yazidi IDPs to Sinjar and for keeping the population in camps in the KRI. These obstacles come in the form of administrative burdens and complicated processes to obtain permission to leave the camps or to travel to Sinjar. Other hurdles derive from the patronage structures created by the Kurdish political parties after they took de-facto control of Sinjar in 2003. IDPs who are on the parties’ payroll would risk losing their salaries if they return to Sinjar or other areas outside of KRG control.57

Indeed, the current economy of displacement incentivizes the KRG to keep IDPs in the region. This incentivization comes in the form of economic opportunities created in the host community’s local economy as a result of IDP settlement in the area (e.g., IDPs paying rent, buying in the local markets, providing cheap labor, and creating employment opportunities in the humanitarian sector for the host community).58

Yazidi activists have also accused the Kurdish authorities of being invested in keeping IDPs in the KRI so they can exert greater electoral influence. If provincial elections are held next year, Kurdish parties, and in particular the KDP, will hold more influence over the IDP vote.59 Precedents for this were reported during the 2017 Kurdish referendum for independence, when many IDPs felt compelled to vote in favor of the referendum, as well as during the 2018 national elections when they were pressured to vote for the KDP.60

Sunni Arabs Prevented from Returning

Sinjar city, previously known to be ethnically and religiously diverse, became almost exclusively inhabited by Yazidis after the military operations ended in 2015.

Sunni Muslims from Sinjar face additional burdens when it comes to returning to their hometowns. Security actors, governmental authorities, and/or members of the community prevent some Sunni Muslim IDPs from returning to Sinjar district and Al-Qahtaniya, and many fear retaliation from these same actors if they attempt to return to their hometowns. This dynamic is a concern in other parts of Nineveh, Kirkuk, Anbar, and Salah-al-din provinces, as well, as thousands of IDP families are being

58 CIVIC interview with a Yazidi civil activist, Dohuk province, February 2020. See also, Saad Salloum, “Barriers to return for Ethno-religious minorities in Iraq. Identity politics and political patronage among Yazidi and Christians Communities from Nineveh Governorate,” IOM, January 2020, https://www.academia.edu/41837657/BARRIERS_TO_RETURN_FOR_ETHNO-RELIGIOUS_MINORITIES_IN_IRAQ.
59 Salloum, “Barriers to return for Ethno-religious minorities in Iraq.”
60 Some interviewees spoke of IDPs in the KRI as fearing being blacklisted by the KRG if they don’t vote for PDK candidates. “Some people support the KDP because they are afraid they would stop getting services. A lot of shingalies (people from Sinjar) travel to the KRG to obtain documents, go to the hospital, or go to university. So, people are afraid of being included in a blacklist and have problems to cross checkpoints or to get services, or even that somebody would harm their families.” CIVIC interview with a civil activist from Sinuni town, Sinuni subdistrict, February 2020. See also: “What do Yazidis make of Kurdish independence?” IRIN, September 19, 2017, https://www.refworld.org/docid/59c1233e4.html.
prevented from returning to their areas of origin due to perceived affiliation with ISIS. However, this problem seems particularly acute in Sinjar, as the Sunni Arab community is collectively being punished because some members participated in the ISIS attacks against the Yazidi population.

As in other parts of Iraq, tribal structures and customs are still important determinants of intra- and inter-community relations in Sinjar. They play a significant role in the resolution of disputes and attribution of responsibilities. For this reason, the participation of members of one village, clan, or tribe in the attacks against Yazidi towns in summer 2014—or the fact that several tribal leaders pledged allegiance to ISIS—makes the whole village, clan, or tribe guilty by association in the view of many Yazidis. Yazidis interviewed by CIVIC in Sinjar and the KRI condemned inhabitants of specific villages and certain tribes for joining ISIS and for collaborating in the attacks against their community. However, some Yazidi individuals seem to attribute blame for the 2014 attacks more widely among their Muslim neighbors because of their long history of marginalization and persecution, as well as the inadequate response of the Kurdish and Iraqi authorities when Sinjar was attacked by ISIS. This attribution of collective guilt does not differentiate between those who commit the attacks, their relatives and tribesmen, and the rest of the Sunni Arab community—many of whom were also victims of ISIS attacks, particularly if they were members of the ISF.

Sunni Arabs and Sunni Kurds currently displaced in the KRI told CIVIC that it was not possible for them or their families to return to their hometowns in Sinjar because they were afraid their families could become victims of retaliatory attacks by their Yazidi neighbors or by the Yazidi armed groups present in the area. Sunni Arab community leaders and other civilians recalled stories of members of their communities being threatened, harassed, or attacked by some of the Yazidi and Shia armed groups and civilians in Sinjar. A tribal leader explained to CIVIC, “Few members of our tribe have returned to our villages in Bulaij [Qaeyrrawan], and they are constantly harassed by the irregular forces there. They stop their vehicles in their checkpoints, ask for their documentation, and keep them there for a long time while they interrogate them. The rest are too afraid to go there.”

Another tribal leader recalled several cases of shots being fired at cars driven by Sunni Arabs, as well as some members of his tribe being abducted by unknown assailants between 2018 and 2019. Community leaders point to some members of the Yazidi community as the authors of these attacks. This is not a new concern. Yazidi-only armed groups were accused of abducting and killing Sunni Arab civilians after the military operations against ISIS in 2015. Accounts such as these have sparked fear among IDPs who deem the situation too unstable and dangerous to return.

“Few members of our tribe have returned to our villages in Bulaij [Qaeyrrawan], and they are constantly harassed by the irregular forces there. They stop their vehicles in their checkpoints, ask for their documentation, and keep them there for a long time while they interrogate them. The rest are too afraid to go there.”

– Mtiwit tribal leader.

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61 This includes families in which one member joined or collaborated with ISIS. The stigma of ISIS affiliation extend to the rest of the family members even though they are innocent. CIVIC is working on an upcoming research report on the impact that the behavior of security actors is having in the return of IDPs to their areas of origin, as well as how families with perceived affiliation with ISIS are being prevented from returning to their hometowns.

62 CIVIC interview with a Sunni Arab government official from Sinjar district, Dohuk, February 2020.

63 CIVIC interview with Sunni Arabs and Sunni Kurds currently living in the KRI conducted in person in Dohuk or by phone, from February to June 2020.

64 CIVIC interview with a tribal leader from the Mtiwit tribe from Qaeyrrawan subdistrict, February 2020, Dohuk.

65 CIVIC interview with a tribal leader from the Shammar tribe from Qaeyrrawan subdistrict, February 2020, Dohuk.

66 CIVIC interviews with Sunni Arab community leaders from Al-Qahtaniya and Qaeyrrawan, Dohuk and by phone, February 2020.

Since the withdrawal of the Peshmerga in 2017, some Sunni Arabs have been able to return to their hometowns in Qaeyrrawan (Bulaij), Albu Khasab, Gawlat, and other Arab-only villages in the district. However, most Arabs are still reluctant to return or have not obtained the necessary security clearances from the National Security Service (NSS) and other relevant security actors to access their villages of origin. A few Sunni Kurdish families have returned to Sinjar city and, due to the recent COVID-19 crisis, to several villages in Sinjar district, but no Sunni Arabs have yet to return to either Sinjar city or any other ethnically-mixed town or group of villages. Threats made in the past by both Yazidi civilians and by members of the security forces, as well as cases of harassment and attacks against Arab families, deepen the concerns of the IDP families.

The destruction of Arab homes during the military operations is another impediment to return. Some of the security forces that took part in the military operations against ISIS, including the Peshmerga, the PMUs, and the YBS, have been accused of purposely destroying Sunni Arab property. “My house was burned by the Peshmerga and the Yazidi forces who liberated the area from ISIS,” an Arab civilian from Gawlat told CIVIC. As in other parts of Nineveh and Kirkuk, Arab villages in Sinjar were ransacked in 2015, set on fire, and later bulldozed by pro-government forces in an attempt to collectively punish the population for their alleged support of ISIS, as well as to impede the return of Arab families once the conflict had ended.

In addition, Sunni Arab and Sunni Kurdish families reported to CIVIC that their homes in Sinjar city were now occupied by Yazidi IDPs whose homes remain destroyed. Some of these properties were also being occupied by members of the security forces, and the original owners fear they will face violence if they try to reclaim them.

Fears of being subjected to violence or blocked from return is leaving thousands of families stranded in their areas of displacement, unsure if they will ever be able to return to their hometowns. The GOI must facilitate the process for those IDPs who seek to return to their areas of origin, and it must find long-term solutions—such as resettlement in other areas of the country—for those who cannot return or who are at risk of being targeted by violence.

In order to guarantee safe returns, Iraqi authorities need to work with all communities in Sinjar to identify the perpetrators of the attacks against Yazidis and Shia Kurds and prosecute them. They should also promote a process of reparations for the individual victims and their communities, and a process of reconciliation between all ethnic and religious components in Sinjar.

68 The return of Sunni Arab IDPs to Gawlat in 2017 caused great controversy among the Yazidi community in Sinjar and some humanitarian actors highlighted the risk of conflict between the returnees and Yazidis from the nearby villages. In addition to the grievances between communities due to the ISIS attacks, some lands belonging to Arab farmers had been occupied and were being farmed by Yazidis from the nearby villages, an issue that could cause confrontations between the communities. CIVIC interviews with NGOs operating in the area and a Sunni Arab resident for Gawlat, February to May 2020.

69 A small number of Sunni Kurdish households in which one family member works for an international NGO operating in the area have been living in Sinjar city for a while. However, the COVID-19 crisis and its impact on livelihood opportunities and movement in Iraq have pushed some Sunni Kurds to return to their villages in Markaz Sinuni, Markaz Sinjar, and Al-Qahtaniya subdistricts. Meanwhile, while members of the Shammar tribe face fewer obstacles when returning to their villages due to their strong opposition to ISIS, they still have not yet been able to return to Sinjar city, either.

70 CIVIC interviews with Sunni Arabs from Gawlat, Sinjar city, and Albu Khasab, conducted in Dohuk or by phone, February to May 2020.


72 CIVIC interview with Sunni Arab civilian from Gawlat, interview conducted by phone, April 2020.


74 CIVIC phone interviews with Sunni Arabs from Sinjar city currently displaced in the KRI, April and May 2020.
The status of Sinjar as a disputed territory and the tensions between the GOI and the KRG over its control are severely impacting the post-stabilization phase of reconstruction, reestablishing services in the area, and creating livelihood opportunities. This is depriving civilians of services, as well as access to their constitutionally guaranteed rights to healthcare, education, and protection by the state. It is also preventing IDPs from returning home, keeping vulnerable populations -- who have already suffered much under ISIS rule and during military operations -- unable to rebuild their lives and unsure about their futures.

Historically, Sinjar district has been neglected by the central Iraqi and Kurdish governments, leaving it underdeveloped in terms of infrastructure and service provision. The ISIS occupation and military operations caused enormous damage to the already limited infrastructure.

Today, the dual mayoral administrations of Mahma Khalil in Dohuk and Fahad Hamid in Sinjar city, as well as the struggle between the KRG and the GOI for control, are having a negative impact on the restoration of services and the reconstruction of public infrastructure. Many civilians living in Sinjar expressed their frustration in interviews with CIVIC.

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75 See, in general, Chapter 1 of the Iraqi Constitution of 2005, as well as articles 31 and 34 regarding access to healthcare and education.

76 Through our interviews, CIVIC observed that more interviewees in Sinjar complained about the effects of this KRG-GOI dispute regarding the stabilization and provision of services than did those living in Dohuk.

77 In 2007, households in Sinjar (including Al-Qataniyah subdistrict) were provided less than 11 hours a day of government electricity, and only 49% of households had an alternative source of electricity. Approximately 83% of households were not connected to the general water network and 72% obtained water from wells, boreholes and water tanks delivered to their homes. Source: “Nineveh Governorate Profile”, UNOCHA and IAU, March 2009. According to an UNAMI report from 2009: “The infrastructure of the Yazidi collective towns is inadequate and, at best, still weak. The streets of the collective towns and their feeder roads are not tarred. Most collective towns are without proper sewage. The greatest drawback is the lack of adequate supplies of potable water, which has to be delivered by truck. Recent years have seen no improvement in the infrastructure or health care of [...] Sinjar and al-Qahtanya’s 11 collective towns [...] which is ironic considering that the improvement in service delivery was the postulated rationale for displacement in the 1970s.” See: UNAMI, “Emerging land tenure issues among displaced Yazidis from Sinjar, Iraq,” November 2015, https://unhabitat.org/node/142208.
“These dual administrations are causing problems with the reconstruction in the area, and if it wasn’t because of the NGOs, a lot of services wouldn’t have been provided. ... There is a desire by the government to help the area, but it is not happening because of this duplication. It is well known that the provision of services is being affected by this. For example, Mayor Fahad, has been appointed by the PMUs, but he doesn’t have the official stamp to bring services. And the other mayor, Mahma Khalil, he lives in KRG and doesn’t care about returning or bringing services here.”

The withdrawal of the KDP Peshmerga forces in October 2017 and the deployment of the ISF and PMUs led to the exodus of the KDP and PUK-affiliated governmental authorities from Sinjar, creating a vacuum in local administration. The appointment of a new mayor, Fahad Hamid, by the PMUs created a duplicate administration, but as of the writing of this report, the original mayor, Mahma Khalil, remains the official mayor. Khalil, who is affiliated with the KRG, is recognized by the GOI and Nineveh authorities and runs a parallel government from Dohuk province. The acting mayor in Sinjar city, Fahad Hamid, acts as an informal interlocutor with the ISF, the PMUs, the YBS, and other pro-government armed forces, as well as with authorities in Nineveh. However, he does not hold official power.

According to Iraqi law, representatives of the GOI ministries and the provincial government must discuss any monetary disbursement or construction of public infrastructure with an official interlocutor appointed by the GOI. However, according to CIVIC interviews with residents of Sinjar, the dispute between the KRG and the GOI over control of Sinjar has prevented the official administration in Dohuk from taking the necessary steps to reestablish services, facilitate the return of government employees, and rebuild infrastructure such as damaged government buildings, healthcare centers, hospitals, schools, roads, and water systems. Interviewees even suggested the administration has been creating obstacles intentionally. For instance, in May 2018, the Iraqi Ministry of Justice authorized the reopening of a criminal court in Sinjar city to investigate cases of ISIS affiliation. The mayor, Mahma Khalil, opposed this reopening, citing concerns over security in the area. He argued that criminal cases regarding ISIS affiliation should be addressed in the KRI, where most of the displaced Yazidi population was at the time. The refusal of the official KDP-affiliated government to collaborate with the Iraqi Ministry of Justice delayed the reopening of the court until February 2020.

The withdrawal of government officials in 2017 and the ongoing lack of government employees means that those with the expertise to run the Sinjar administration and lead reconstruction efforts are located in the KRI. Although provincial authorities and the central government have required government employees in other parts of Iraq to resume their work or risk losing their salaries, no such ultimatum has been made in Sinjar. Many are reluctant to return to Sinjar due to the perceived instability in the area. Sunni Kurds and Arabs who worked in the public administration or as teachers and doctors fear retaliatory attacks if they return, while many Yazidi government employees feel it is unsafe to return or have resettled in the KRI. Meanwhile, authorities affiliated with the KDP and PUK

78 CIVIC interview with a civilian, Sinjar city, February 2020.
79 CIVIC interview with a school teacher and civil activist currently working in a school, Sinuni subdistrict, February 2020.
80 See, generally, Coalition Provisional Authority, order 95, Financial Management law and Public Debt Law, June 4, 2004. See also, Law 21 of 2008 regarding the Governorates not organized within a region.
82 CIVIC interviews with civil activist in Sinuni and government authorities displaced in Dohuk, February 2020.
83 Kurdish parties had been working since the fall of the Ba’ath regime to co-opt the local elites by building a system of loyalty through patronage structures, which had been a system far superior to that of the GOI in 2017. In order to be appointed for non-elected government jobs, locals were required to be affiliated with the Kurdish parties, especially the KDP. Over time, most of the employees in the local administration in Sinjar were effectively affiliated with a Kurdish party.
have been instructed by their parties not to enter PMU and YBS/YPG-controlled territories and to not resume their positions in Sinjar. As a condition for the official administration to return, KDP-affiliated government officials in Dohuk demand the return of the Peshmerga forces to the area, the creation of a joint command with the ISF, and the expulsion of the YBS/YPG, the PMUs, and the new acting administration. An interviewee from the current acting administration in Sinjar told CIVIC, “They don’t want to return because the Peshmerga left. They want the GOI and the KRG to take control back [so they can return].”

Few government offices are operating in the district to date. Those that are open are understaffed and are limited in what they can do. For instance, only the Civil Affairs Directorate (CAD) of Sinuni subdistrict is operating, and it is only open one day per week and limited in the paperwork it can process. Civilians who are official residents of Sinuni can only renew their nationality card (betaqa jenisiah), nationality certificate (Shadi Jenisiyah), or residency card (betaqa Sekan). The CAD of Markaz Sinjar and Qaeyrwan remain closed, with their staff working from Tel Keif approximately 85 miles from Sinjar. Residents from these areas must travel the distance to Tel Keif for their documents. The Real Estate Registration Office in Sinjar city also remains closed, which prevents civilians from being able to obtain copies of their property titles—an obstacle to applying for compensation under the Iraqi Compensation Law for death, injury, or property damage during military operations or from terrorism.

Moreover, because the acting mayor and the PMU-appointed subdistrict directors lack official government stamps, their signatures are not accepted by government institutions outside of the district. Civilians must travel to the official administration in Dohuk to get certain documents signed in order to apply for their civil documents in Tel Keif. In addition, all residents of Sinjar must travel to Mosul to obtain their Public Distribution System (PDS) card or the new unified civil ID card (betaqa wataniya).

This situation creates an undue burden of time and cost for civilians living in Sinjar, as it can take several days to travel to Dohuk, where they must wait for approvals before continuing on to Tel Keif. For the Yazidi population, especially those who suffered under ISIS and/or were held captive in these locations, driving through Tal Afar and Mosul can be emotionally challenging and

“They don’t want to return because the Peshmerga left. They want the GOI and the KRG to take control back [so they can return].”

- Member of the local administration in Sinjar.

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84 CIVIC interview with a civilian, Sinuni town, February 2020. CIVIC interviews with local authorities affiliated to the KDP currently displaced in Dohuk, February 2020.
85 CIVIC interview with a member of the acting local administration in Sinjar district, Sinjar city, February 2020.
86 Such is the case of the Directorates of Health, Agriculture, Education, Municipalities, and Water. Despite having been opened, they have not fully resumed their work due to the absence of key government employees and/or the necessary authorizations to resume their work. Source: CIVIC interviews with civilians, Sinuni town and Sinjar city, February 2020. Meanwhile, teachers interviewed in one of the schools in Sinuni subdistrict said they have to go to Mosul to deal with the Directorate of Education if they need anything, as the offices in Sinjar are still not operating. Source: CIVIC interviews with two school teachers, Sinuni subdistrict, February 2020.
87 The staff from the CAD in Al-Qahtaniya works some days each week from the CAD in Sinuni, where they provide documentation to the residents of Al-Qahtaniya.
88 Tel Keif is a four- to five-hour drive from Sinjar, and it requires crossing multiple checkpoints. People would need to drive through Mosul to get there, or take a longer detour through Dohuk. Source: CIVIC interviews with civilians and local authorities in Sinjar city and Sinuni, as well as meetings with NGOs working on legal assistance in Sinjar, February to June 2020.
89 CIVIC interviews with civil activists, local authorities, and NGOs operating in the area, Sinuni subdistrict and Sinjar city, February 2020.
retraumatizing. Additionally, some family members of individuals affiliated with the PMUs or the YBS/YPG cannot enter the KRI without the risk of being arrested by the KRG security forces, which prevents them from obtaining important civil documentation.  

Access to healthcare is also poor in the district. As noted above, few healthcare centers destroyed during the ISIS offensive have been rebuilt, and there is a shortage of medical personnel. Currently, there are only hospital facilities in Sinuni subdistrict and Sinjar city. With none in Al-Qahtaniyah and Qaeyrrawan subdistricts, people must travel for treatment. Existing hospitals have been built or rehabilitated by international donors and NGOs; in addition to being staffed by NGOs, these facilities are hiring new medical staff or are paying additional salaries to government-employed doctors to incentivize them to resume their posts. This arrangement is unsustainable in the long term when international donors stop funding these services.

Many public schools in Sinjar remain damaged, as well. Teachers have not resumed working in schools across the district, either because of security concerns or because they have decided to continue working in the IDP camps in the KRI. As result, there is a shortage of official teachers in Sinjar, which endangers a new generation of children’s right to education. CIVIC visited a school in Sinuni town where only four government-employed teachers were in charge of 1,420 students, with additional support coming only in the form of “volunteer teachers” whose salaries were paid by an

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90 CIVIC interviews with civilians and local authorities, Sinuni and Sinjar city, February 2020.
91 Many government-employed doctors at the district’s primary health centers and hospitals have not resumed their positions and remained displaced working in the KRI or in Nineveh plains, where they still receive their government salaries. Those who have returned have done so due to the incentive of additional salaries provided by NGOs. NGOs have also hired additional doctors to cover those absent.
The lack of teachers is particularly overwhelming in the Sardaste IDP camp located on the top of Sinjar Mountain. Here, 14 teachers are in charge of 1,500 children living in the camp and surrounding towns. Poor access to education and lack of livelihood opportunities has led some boys and girls of school age to join local security forces to provide income for their families. Recruiting children under 18 years old into armed forces is forbidden by the Convention of the Rights of the Child and its Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict, but even though Iraq was a party to the Convention’s ratification, the prohibition has been difficult to enforce in Sinjar. A social worker working at the Sardaste IDP camp told CIVIC, “Some families in the camp have little income to subsist, so they have one of their sons joining the force, not because they support them, but just because they need the money.”

The Iraqi government has a responsibility to ensure access to education and healthcare for all Iraqi citizens, as mandated in the Iraqi Constitution and outlined in international human rights treaties that Iraq is party to. The failure to uphold the rights of Iraqi civilians is discouraging the return of IDPs to their areas of origin, which will likely contribute to or entrench changes to the ethnic composition of Sinjar catalyzed by the violence of 2014.

Security Actors’ Behavior and Impact on Civilians

Today, over ten security actors are operating in Sinjar district. These forces include regular Iraqi forces such as the Iraqi army and local police, security forces linked to the KRG such as the Fermanda Ezikhane (or Yazidi Peshmerga) and the Hêza Parastina Ezîdxanê (HPE), groups affiliated with the PMU, and the YBS. All these different armed actors conduct military, security, and law enforcement duties in the same locations with little to no coordination between them and without adequate oversight. This security situation makes it difficult for civilians to exercise their right to report crimes and seek accountability through formal mechanisms.

Lack of Coordination and Oversight Mechanisms

CIVIC’s interviews with residents of Sinjar, irrespective of their ethnicity, religion, or political affiliation, showed an unease about the instability caused by the complex network of security actors, as well as...
a sense that it hinders the stabilization process. An activist explained, “There are too many armed groups here. You do not know who is doing what. There is not a single unified force.” Civilians who remain in displacement camps told CIVIC that the presence of multiple security actors is one of the factors preventing them from returning.

Each of the security forces operating in Sinjar receives orders from different government authorities, political parties, and/or neighboring states. Within the ISF, the Iraqi army is under the command of the MOD, while the local police force is under the MOI. PMU-affiliated forces fall under the PMU structure of command and receive orders from the PMU Committee in Baghdad, which is technically under the prime minister’s office (although this is not the case in practice). PMU-affiliated forces include the Shia PMUs, Yazidi PMUs (the Lalesh and Kocho Brigades), the YBS (which is linked with YPG/YBJ in northeastern Syria), and tribal PMUs composed of the Sunni Arab tribes in Qaeqyrawan, Al-Qahtaniya, and Al-Baaj. Some Shia PMUs such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Kata’ib Hizbollah, and Kata’ib al-Imam Ali are closely associated with the Iranian government and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. The HPE force (led by Hayder Shesho) and Qassim Shesho’s Fermanda Ezikhane (also called Yazidi Peshmerga) both respond to KRG authorities.

The areas controlled by each of these security actors are not clearly delimited and can range from several towns to most of the district. The Nineveh Operations Command (NOC), for example, is supposed to coordinate the work of the different actors operating in Nineveh Governorate, but, in practice, not all forces in the area are under its control.

The different security actors, each backed by their own political patrons, have diverging interests in Sinjar—including taxing the smuggling business across the border—and they share an underlying mistrust of each other’s intentions. These tensions can escalate into open confrontation, a scenario that civilians told CIVIC they are afraid of. A male civilian from Sinuni subdistrict said, “Nobody knows if there is going to be a fight. These forces say they are working together, but each of them is doing their own thing and it is a huge threat to civilians because a fight can start at any moment.” For instance, in June 2018, PMU soldiers from the Kata’ib al-Imam Ali Brigade stopped a vehicle with HPE soldiers and demanded they hand over their weapons. This action provoked a verbal altercation. Later, HPE troops made a show of force in the areas under their control near Zorava and Duhola towns, as well as in Sinjar city. The mayor of Sinjar city, a commander of the Iraqi Army, and the head of a Yazidi political party had to intervene, mediating between the groups to avoid escalation.

97 CIVIC interviews with civilians, Sinjar district and the KRI, February to May 2020.
98 CIVIC interview with a civil activist and NGO leader, conducted by phone, February 2020.
99 CIVIC interviews with IDPs currently living in the KRI, February to May 2020.
100 Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Kata’ib Hizbollah, and Kata’ib al-Imam Ali have limited presence in Sinjar district, but their members manage important checkpoints along the Mosul-Tal Afar- Sinjar-Syria highway. Moreover, they exert a significant level of influence on smaller Shia and non-Shia PMUs operating in the district.
101 CIVIC interviews with local authorities currently in Sinjar, authorities displaced in Dohuk, and NGOs operating in the area, February to May 2020.
102 This area will soon be under the umbrella of the West Nineveh Operations Command (WNOC) formed through Executive Order 153 issued by the prime minister on March 17, 2020, which will oversee security management in Tal Afar, Sinjar, and Al-Baaj districts.
103 Low-rank Yazidi soldiers and mid-rank commanders of the different forces might share common interests (e.g., having a unified Yazidi force in control of Sinjar and free of external influence), but their external patrons (and funders) often have other strategic interests. Some of these interests are not reconcilable. For instance, the YBS and the PKK want to keep a military presence in Sinjar, as it provides them with influence over the Syria-Iraq border, control over the smuggling routes, and a foothold in Iraq. In the other side, the KDP wants to regain control of the district, but is unwilling to negotiate with the PKK and YBS or allow them to have a presence in the area.
104 Civilian interview, Dogure town in Sinuni Subdistrict, February 2020.
Security forces also sometimes set up checkpoints or launch cordon-and-search operations on their own, without coordinating with other forces—particularly those they do not recognize as legitimate. For example, some clashes between the Iraqi army and the PMUs on the one hand, and the HPE and the YBS forces on the other, start because members of the Iraqi army and the PMUs stop HPE or YBS convoy vehicles. When they attempt to search HPE and YBS vehicles, or ask occupants to hand over their weapons, they demonstrate their lack of trust in these forces and their refusal to recognize their legitimacy. \(^{106}\)

The presence of myriad security forces with overlapping areas of operations, different chains of command, and a lack of coordination creates gaps in security that could be exploited by ISIS members and criminal organizations. \(^{107}\) Moreover, this fractured security apparatus makes it challenging for civilians to report crime or request assistance to investigate incidents. \(^{108}\)

According to Iraqi criminal law, the local police force is the authority responsible for investigating crimes and taking cases to the courts. \(^{109}\) Other bodies, such as the NSS, can conduct arrests for specific matters of national security, but Iraq’s Code of Criminal Procedure otherwise gives local police sole authority to conduct arrests, requiring police to obtain a warrant to arrest a suspect and to bring him/her before a judicial investigator within 24 hours. However, interviewees told CIVIC that the local police office is understaffed and under-equipped, and that they are not empowered to investigate or prosecute crimes—particularly if they involve members of the security forces. \(^{110}\) An interviewee told CIVIC about one of their relatives, for example, who was detained after purchasing a car in Sinuni subdistrict: “The National Security Service (NSS) and the YBS detained him and accused him of stealing the car. He was later set free, but they kept the car. If he had indeed stolen the car, why wasn’t he arrested? If not, why why he didn’t get his car back?”\(^{111}\)

In some cases, Sinjaris are arbitrarily detained by security forces in violation of Iraqi criminal law and without it being communicated to the local police. An interviewee told CIVIC about how his cousin was missing for ten days, and only after many calls with the Asayish in the KRG and the authorities in Sinjar were they able to find where he was being held without charge by the YBS and get him released. \(^{112}\) Indeed, many Iraqis have to use their personal connections to contact security forces and local authorities in order to locate their relatives. \(^{113}\) Interviewees who had not experienced similar problems were

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\(^{106}\) CIVIC interview with local authorities, Sinuni subdistrict, February 2020.

\(^{107}\) CIVIC interviews with local authorities and members of some of the security forces operating in Sinjar, February 2020.

\(^{108}\) CIVIC interviews with civilians, Sinuni subdistrict, February 2020.


\(^{110}\) The local police in Sinjar lack technical equipment. They cannot take fingerprints or other evidence from a crime scene, as there are no forensic teams in the area, and they cannot track phone numbers, etc.

\(^{111}\) CIVIC interview with a civilian displaced in the KRI, conducted by phone, May 2020.

\(^{112}\) CIVIC interview with a member of the official administration of Sinjar affiliated with the KDP and now displaced in Dohuk, February 2020.

\(^{113}\) Two civilians interviewed in Sinjar shared similar experiences of having a relative arrested by a security force, as well as the difficulties they faced finding that relative. Source: CIVIC interviews with civilians, Sinuni subdistrict and Sinjar city, February 2020.
nonetheless afraid of having their family members arrested by a security actor and not knowing their whereabouts. “If somebody is arrested, you don’t know which force took him,” a civilian told CIVIC. Other civilians interviewed shared similar concerns.\(^{114}\)

In practice, the resolution of personal disputes and petty crimes is dealt with through informal mechanisms. For instance, an individual involved in a dispute might call a community leader or a family member who belongs to a security force to mediate the dispute or resolve an issue.\(^{115}\) Of course, the response of the authorities or security forces appealed to will heavily depend on the connections and status of both the victim and the offender. Moreover, there is no written record of the incident kept.

Indeed, personal and family status and “wasta” (personal connections) play a prominent role in navigating the legal and judicial systems in Iraq, making accountability a matter of connections and status rather than a matter of justice or rule of law. The GOI has a duty to protect its citizens and ensure that crimes are adequately investigated and prosecuted by legally recognized actors. This requires establishing mechanisms to oversee the security forces operating in the country, as well as reporting tools that enable civilians to file complaints without retaliation by members of the security forces.

**Harassment and Violence Against Civilians**

Civilians from different ethnic groups told CIVIC that they were asked for bribes by security actors manning checkpoints. A Yazidi interviewee in Sinjar told CIVIC that trucks bringing products into Sinjar city were often stopped by the PMUs operating the checkpoint at the main entrance and asked for a bribe.\(^{116}\) Another interviewee, a Sunni Arab resident of Qaeyrrawan subdistrict, reported that members of his tribe had been extorted during the harvesting season by PMU soldiers asking farmers for bribes.\(^{117}\) Reports also indicate that some PMU members try to extort the owners of alcohol shops in exchange for allowing them to remain open.\(^{118}\)

Sunni Arab community leaders told CIVIC that members of their tribes are sometimes prevented from accessing their hometowns—either to return or to visit—and are harassed by Yazidi-only security forces, especially at checkpoints.\(^{119}\) Some of the communities who have returned to their villages find themselves isolated from the Yazidi community and live in fear of being targeted by Yazidi or Shia armed actors and civilians.\(^{120}\) Allegedly, only members of the Shammar tribe venture to drive through Sinjar city, while members of other tribes such as the Mitewit, the Jehesh, or the Khawatna shared that they would not visit the city for services, shopping, or even to just drive through.\(^{121}\)

114 CIVIC interview with a civilian displaced in the KRI, February 2020.
115 CIVIC interview with civilians, Sinuni subdistrict and Sinjar city, February 2020.
116 CIVIC interview with a civilian in Sinjar city, February 2020. Interviewees in the northern parts of the district (Sinuni subdistrict) did not report experiencing extortion by any member of the security forces. This may be because the YBS is a stronger actor in these areas, which would discourage other security forces from extorting civilians.
117 CIVIC interview with a tribal leader from Qaeyrrawan, Dohuk city, February 2020.
118 An interviewee reported that trucks transporting alcohol inside Sinjar city had to pay a bribe to the PMU unit controlling the Umm Shababit Junction checkpoint in the Tal Afar – Sinjar. Source: CIVIC interview with a civilian, Sinjar city, February 2020. Other interviewees suggested that alcohol shops were pressured to pay bribes to the new PMUs in order to remain open in the city.
119 Sunni Arab community leader complained to CIVIC of security actors harassing their relatives and stopping them for extended periods at checkpoints under the pretext of doing security checks. CIVIC interviews with Sunni Arab community leaders from Sinjar, conducted in Dohuk and by phone, February to May 2020.
120 CIVIC interviews with Sunni Arabs from Sinjar, Dohuk, February 2020.
121 Several members of the Mitewit tribe currently living in their villages in Qaeyrrawan explained to CIVIC that community members would travel to Mosul if they need to go to the hospital and that they would use secondary roads to reach the Tal Afar – Mosul highway to avoid passing through Sinjar city. Source: CIVIC interviews with Sunni Arabs from Sinjar, including two members of the Mitewit tribe originally from Qaeyrrawan, Dohuk, February 2020. Because tribal leaders of the Shammar tribe collectively stood against ISIS, and even helped Yazidis to flee, the tribe enjoys better relations with the Yazidi community. Even though Shammar residents from Sinjar city have not been able to return to their homes, tribal leaders told CIVIC that those living in villages in Qaeyrrawan, Al-Qahtaniya, and Al-Baaj can drive through the road in Sinjar city and, in some instances, go shopping. However, the relations with Yazidis are still tense. A Shammar sheikh explained that many Shammar are now reluctant to travel through the city after attacks by “unknown assailants.” Source: CIVIC interviews with Sunni Arab Shammar tribal leaders from Qaeyrrawan and Rabee’a, Dohuk, February and April 2020.
Cases of violence against Sunni Arabs in the area have also been reported. In October 2018, unidentified individuals stopped a vehicle occupied by a member of the Al-Baaj Municipal Council and a Sheikh from Shammar tribe near Domiz complex. Both occupants were shot and killed. A similar incident occurred in September 2019, when attackers shot at a car occupied by members of the Mitewit tribe on a road leading to Sinjar city. The authorship of these attacks remains unknown, and Arab community leaders have criticized the way the investigation was carried out.

Members of the Iraqi Army and the Shia PMU, which took control in October 2017, angered the Yazidi population, in particular, when they tried to shut down alcohol shops, ban the sale of alcohol in Sinjar, and ban men from wearing shorts in public for religious reasons. The local Yazidi population interpreted these incidents as attempts to impose Islamic religious values on their community—a very sensitive topic since the 2014 ISIS attacks. Although such restrictions were eased after local authorities reached out to force commanders, the incidents seem to indicate that some security forces seek to impose their own values in the area, regardless of their mandate to uphold Iraqi law and maintain security.

Interviewees also told CIVIC about several cases of harassment by members of the security forces in Sinjar against female Yazidis. They complained about incidents of security forces staring, taking pictures, or attempting to engage in conversations with local women walking on their own or shopping in the local markets. These incidents have caused an outcry in the Yazidi community and have increased resentment against security forces originating from outside Sinjar.

During CIVIC’s interviews in Sinjar, individuals complained about some armed groups more than others and described how different forces were better at responding to civilian complaints. While some Yazidi civilians reported misconduct and harm by members of the local police, the Iraqi army, and the Yazidi and Shia PMUs, no Yazidi civilian interviewed in Sinjar complained against Qassim Shesho’s forces, the HPE forces led by Hayder Shesho, or the YBS. Two civilian interviewees, one of whom is a former member of the YBS, said that the YBS specifically encourages civilians to report any misconduct by their members. CIVIC asked a current senior commander of the force about existing mechanisms for civilians to file complaints against members of the security forces, and he explained that civilians can file a complaint before the commander of the unit, with the local authorities, or at the MECLIS (local councils organized by the political wing of the YBS). CIVIC was unable to verify that this mechanism is standardized and that filed complaints result in any formal action. However, as noted above, Sunni Arabs raised concerns about the behavior of the Yazidi and Shia PMU, the HPE, and the YBS forces.

The GOI and the Nineveh provincial authorities must mandate trainings on Iraqi law, human rights, policing, and cultural norms prior to their deployment to Sinjar. They must also ensure there are
adequate reporting and accountability mechanisms in place. In April 2019, the Nineveh Provincial Council passed Policy 323, which commits provincial authorities to build the capacity of the security forces operating in Nineveh on protection of civilians.\(^{132}\) The provincial government must take the necessary steps to implement this policy and make it effective. The GOI and Nineveh provincial authorities also need to ensure that local security forces include women, represent local ethnic and religious diversity, and incorporate residents from the area where they operate in order to strengthen ties to the community and enhance accountability to them.

### Civilian Harm from Turkish Airstrikes

The Turkish Air forces (TAF) regularly conduct airstrikes in civilian-populated areas of Sinjar, spreading panic among the population. In our interviews, civilians, local authorities, and members of the security forces consistently raised concerns about the Turkish airstrikes, including fears of being harmed or having their property damaged.

The Turkish government has warned of PKK and YPG presence on Sinjar Mountain numerous times.\(^{133}\) Yet the TAF has continued striking YBS targets in Sinjar despite the withdrawal of the PKK from Sinjar Mountain in March 2018. Since May 2018, Turkey has launched at least 17 airstrikes in Sinjar district.\(^{134}\) The most recent attacks occurred on June 15, 2020, when the TAF launched several missiles at different locations in the Sinjar mountains, including Chalmira, Sukaniya, Bara, and Bab Shile. According to local eyewitnesses, some missiles struck in the proximity of Sardaste IDP camp, which still houses a significant number of IDPs, as well as near other villages on Sinjar Mountain.\(^{135}\)

Although the Turkish government justifies their military attacks on the basis of fighting “terrorists,” the PKK (or the Syrian YPG/YPJ forces) officially withdrew from Sinjar Mountain in March 2018.\(^{136}\) Today, the forces on the ground are members of the local YBS, a local armed group formed and commanded by Yazidis from Sinjar. While the group has a close relationship with the Syrian YPG/YPJ forces, the GOI has recognized the YBS as a local force and a member of the PMU committee, from whom YBS soldiers receive their salaries.\(^{137}\) Their status implies that the Turkish government is, in fact, attacking Iraqi nationals who are members of an officially recognized security force that is integrated in the PMU structure.\(^{138}\)

\(^{132}\) Resolution No. 323 of the Nineveh Provincial Council passed on April 10th, 2019.


\(^{134}\) Information provided to CIVIC by an NGO monitoring security developments in Sinjar district, April 2020. A particularly controversial attack was the airstrike that killed Zeki Shingali, a senior commander of the YBS, who was well respected by the local population because of his role in the fight against ISIS and in evacuating the Yazidi civilians trapped on Sinjar Mountain in August 2014. Shingali was killed on his way back from a memorial to commemorate the ISIS massacre of Yazidis in the town of Kocho. The fact that he was targeted on a day commemorating the Yazidi genocide was heavily criticized by Yazidis in Sinjar and abroad. See Amberin Zaman, “Turkey kills PKK leader in Sinjar,” Al-Monitor, August 16, 2018, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/fa/originals/2018/08/turkey-airstrike-kills-pkk-leader-sinjar.html


\(^{137}\) CIVIC interview with a member of the YBS, Simuni town, February 2020; CIVIC interview with a security analyst, conducted via phone, April 2020.

\(^{138}\) The Turkish military has a long history of targeting alleged PKK fighters in the northern mountains of the KRI. These attacks receive little condemnation, if any, from the GOI or the KRG authorities. See Khrush Najari, “For third time in a year, Turkish warplanes targeting PKK strike near village in Kurdistan Region,” Kurdistan24, May 23, 2020, https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/9cddb71f6c1f-4d52-b337-2eeef8ad0745
While the airstrikes are reportedly targeting YBS military bases, the YBS has bases inside of towns and cities. This means that many of the airstrikes have occurred in civilian-populated areas, and their proximity to villages and population centers poses a considerable risk to civilian lives. Turkish authorities give no warnings to civilians prior to airstrikes in populated areas to allow civilians to seek safety. In addition to these attacks’ psychological effects on the local population, they also cause loss of livelihood and can be a driver of secondary displacement for some families. They are causing damage to infrastructure (roads and water systems), for example, as well as to civilian property. In some cases, civilians’ sheep have run away during attacks, and pasture fields near civilian villages have been set ablaze.

CIVIC interviewed numerous civilians in Sinjar who cited the Turkish airstrikes as one of their main security concerns. Inhabitants of Khanasor, Sinuni, and Dogure—all towns that have been hit by Turkish missiles in recent times—told CIVIC that they were afraid their houses could be accidentally targeted by Turkish planes or that an attack could harm children playing in the street. The psychological stress and trauma caused by the strikes also needs to be considered.

The TAF airstrikes are also a major concern because they are happening in areas where people live and work. People are afraid of being targeted, but also because this is a traumatized [population] that has lived through conflict, and is affected by the sound of bombs.

- Civilian from Sinjar.

Finally, the recurrent airstrikes in locations like Khanasor town are affecting the provision of humanitarian assistance and the implementation of development programs in the area, as some NGOs have security concerns and are reluctant to work in towns where airstrikes might take place.

Civilian Harm from ERW and IED Contamination

Years of war have left a dangerous legacy of explosive ordnance contamination in Iraq. From the Iran-Iraq war, the Anfal Campaign, and the 1990 Gulf War to the 2003 US invasion and the 2014 fight against ISIS, the contamination is vast and multi-layered. It affects almost all areas of the country, including Sinjar, and includes a diverse range of explosive materials, including conventional explosive ordnance such as ERWs (rockets, mortars, etc.), conventional and improvised anti-personnel mines, anti-vehicle mines, cluster munitions, as well as command-operated IEDs that were abandoned by combatants.

A common practice among ISIS forces in retreat was to plant victim-activated IEDs around public infrastructure or on private property. This contamination was compounded by ERWs left during military operations. Several areas of Sinjar remain contaminated to this date, delaying the return of civilians.

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140 Civil interviews with civilians, Sinuni and Khanasor towns, February 2020.

141 Civil interview of activist in Sinjar, conducted via phone, February 2020.

142 CIVIC interviews with civilians, Sinuni town, February 2020. Some staff members from NGOs operating in Sinjar districted pointed out that donors and NGOs are reluctant to implement activities in Khanasor due to the risk of Turkish airstrikes.

of civilians to their homes. Schools, water plants, public buildings, roads, civilian houses, and businesses continue to be rigged with IEDs that function as booby traps. Returnees whose homes have been destroyed cannot clear the rubble and build new homes because of concerns that IEDs remain in the rubble.144

The map below shows areas identified as being contaminated with explosive ordnances, as well as the areas cleared as of May 2020.145 Areas south of Sinjar Mountain, such as Sinjar city and towns in Al-Qahtaniya and Qaeyrrawan, are significantly more contaminated than areas north of Sinjar Mountain.

While the GOI security forces are leading clearance efforts in the country, ERW clearance needs are enormous, necessitating support of non-governmental actors and the UN to decontaminate areas so that families can return home safely. Several actors are currently involved in ERW clearance, including the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), private contractors hired to clear certain areas, NGOs like the Mine Advisory Group (MAG), an explosive clearance unit from the ISF, and armed groups such as the YBS.

Clearance of explosive ordnances has been slowed by obstacles, including timely issuance of work approvals and poor coordination, which have raised doubts about the rigor of decontamination in areas where operations have taken place. Non-governmental ordnance clearance actors have recurrent access challenges, such as changes to access permission procedures and delays in

144 Ibid.
receiving renewed access documentation and occasional issues crossing checkpoints. In addition, the Iraqi Directorate of Mine Action (DMA), who is in charge of coordinating clearance campaigns in Iraq, can take up to a month to approve clearance plans submitted by non-governmental actors. This kind of delay affects clearance efforts that need to be done within a donor-supported time frame. Sensitivities surrounding explosive clearance in Iraq is another obstacle jeopardizing the overall pace of decontamination activities. For example, non-governmental ordnance clearance actors reported having their operations canceled, despite having prior approval from the DMA, because the ISF decided it would clear the area on its own.

The clearance of improvised and conventional anti-personnel mines requires meticulous assessment of the contaminated areas and adherence to strict international practices to ensure the clearance is done thoroughly. However, CIVIC interviews show that some of the ISF’s campaigns to deactivate and remove explosive ordnance may not have complied with international standards. It is possible that some of the units lack the equipment and the technical capacity to conduct clearing operations in a safe and comprehensive manner, which has led to injuries and fatalities among their troops. Civilians have raised doubts about the way in which some areas were cleared, requesting non-government clearance actors to inspect their houses to ensure they are truly free from explosives. However, these clearance actors have had to decline because the areas were already officially declared cleared by the ISF and the DMA. Tel Ezer town, located in the center of Al-Qahtaniyah, is one of these cases. The town was decontaminated by the ISF after other clearance actors, who had already submitted their plans to the DMA, were sidelined. Because the ISF declared the area clear, the DMA did not authorize other organizations to contribute to the operations. However, according to local mine experts, the clearance carried out by the ISF may not have been thorough, which could create danger for residents if they return.

Similarly, armed actors such as the YBS who are helping to clear their hometowns lack appropriate equipment and training. Not only does this put them at risk, it could also endanger civilians if their teams inadvertently leave explosive hazards behind. Moreover, the operations may give the false impression that the areas are cleared of explosive ordnances, prompting civilians to return to areas that are still unsafe.

A coordinated and streamlined process by the DMA to grant approvals for clearance operations and allow humanitarian actors to complete tasks, would reduce delays to clearance work and allow for needed continuity and thorough operations. Authorities should avoid cancelling pre-approved and ongoing clearance operations, as this slows the overall clearance work. In addition, any clearance done by the ISF should be reported into Iraq’s mine action database so all relevant actors are aware of completed work. The GOI needs to make sure that changes in access, regulations, and the process of obtaining permits is done in an organized and structured manner and does not stop or slow down operations. When implementing new access procedures and prior to closing the previous system, authorities need to make sure that the new application process for permits

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146 In recent years, the GOI has, on numerous occasions, changed the regulations and requirements for non-governmental actors to access the field, as well as which authorities issue permits. This has caused delays in obtaining new permits and brought the implementation of projects to a halt. Mine-clearing actors have been affected by these regulatory changes and cumbersome bureaucratic procedures, as well. Source: CIVIC interviews with non-governmental ordnance clearance actors working in Iraq, May 2020.

147 For a long time, UN agencies could not clear explosives on private property due to liability issues. Mine-clearing actors could only clear government property such as schools, roads, or water tanks. It took a long time for the GOI to grant a liability exemption so that UN agencies could begin to operate. Source: CIVIC interviews with UN agencies and NGOs working in Sinjar district, May 2020.

148 CIVIC interviews with members of UN agencies and NGOs working in Sinjar district, May 2020.

149 CIVIC interviews with local authorities in Sinjar city and NGOs operating in the district, February and May 2020.

150 CIVIC interviews with members of UN agencies and NGOs working in Sinjar district, May 2020.

151 Ibid.

152 CIVIC interviews with members of UN agencies and NGOs working in Sinjar district, May 2020.
is properly set and that all the relevant authorities and security forces involved are informed. Temporary access permits for clearance actors accredited by the GOI should also be provided, so they can continue their work while they obtain new, full access permits.

**Delays in Accessing Compensation**

Under Law No. 20 (2009) and its subsequent amendments on compensation (hereinafter “compensation law”), Iraqi civilians have a right to obtain compensation from the GOI for death, injuries, and damage affecting work, study, or property as a result of terrorist actions or military operations. However, numerous obstacles stand in the way of civilians seeking such compensation. Although the process of applying for compensation varies depending on the province, it is often long and arduous, and final disbursements have been delayed across Iraq due to bureaucratic obstacles and an insufficient budget. However, in Sinjar, the process of obtaining compensation for harm is particularly difficult. According to local authorities and NGOs, few civilians have been able to complete the application process, and none have obtained payment to date. Moreover, most of the individuals who spoke to CIVIC did not know how to apply for compensation and thought the process was too cumbersome.

In order to apply for compensation for damage or destruction of property, an applicant must submit a copy of their property title—also called “tapoo”—to the Office of the Sub-committee for Compensation in the district where the property is located. However, there is currently no Sub-Committee Office in Sinjar where citizens can apply. In addition, most residents lost their property titles due to the conflict. If lost, citizens can obtain a copy of their property title at the Real Estate Registration Office (or “Tapoo Office”) in their district, but currently there is no office of this sort operating in Sinjar, either. Citizens would have to travel to Mosul or Baghdad to obtain a copy of their property title. The compensation law does allow an exception for those who have lost their property title: they can submit an Ownership Proof Form to the compensation office. However, CIVIC could not independently verify any individual who has been able to apply for compensation following this mechanism. It is not clear that this would even be a viable option for citizens of Sinjar district because 1) due to the absence of a district council and the official local authorities, applicants would still have to travel to Dohuk, and 2) the activity of the provincial and district councils was suspended by the GOI in October 2019.

Sunni Arabs and Sunni Kurds from Sinjar city who lost their property titles face additional problems. They cannot access their properties in Sinjar in order to collect the evidence necessary to submit a compensation claim because they fear retaliation by the Yazidi community. In some instances, their homes are, in fact, occupied by Yazidi IDPs.

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154 See CIVIC brief on compensation: “‘We Hope, But We Are Hopeless’: Civilians’ Perspectives of the Compensation Process in Iraq,” Center for Civilians in Conflict, October 2018.

155 CIVIC interviews with civilians and local authorities, Sinjar district, February 2020.


157 In theory, residents can obtain copies of their property titles at the Provincial Registration Office, but since many of the registries in Mosul were destroyed during the conflict, civilians must travel to Baghdad and obtain a copy from the Central Real Estate Registration Office. Source: CIVIC interview with a civilian from Sinjar district, April 2020. See also Property Compensation Guidelines (amended) based on Iraqi Law No. 20 (2009).

158 This exception is for individuals who had a property title under their name but have lost the document, not for those who never held a title for their lands. The form must be endorsed by the Mukhtar of the area where the property is located, as well as the municipal council, the local authorities, and two witnesses. See: Property Compensation Guidelines (amended) based on Iraqi Law No. 20 (2009).

The requirement to present a property title is also an undue burden for the residents of the “forced collectives” (mujama’at) built by Saddam’s regime in the 1970s, which made them vulnerable and amounted to a denial of their right to have their private property recognized by the state. Those affected by the Arabization polices in Sinjar were forced to leave their ancestral towns in the Sinjar mountains and resettle in “collectives” built below. They were never granted property titles for their new houses and lands, so they do not have anything to present at the Office of Compensation and cannot obtain documentation from the Real Estate Registration Office. Beyond not being able to apply for compensation, the lack of access to civil documentation for their properties causes other problems for affected civilians, including long and costly judicial processes to recover properties occupied by someone else.

Although NGOs, UNHABITAT, civil activists, and political representatives have been advocating since 2017 for a legal reform to grant full property rights and titles to families resettled in the collectives (mujama’at) due to the Arabization policies of the 1970s, no such reform has been approved to date.

Legally, the GOI has assumed the duty of compensating civilians for property damage and personal loss experienced due to the conflict. The 2019 Nineveh POC policy also acknowledges the need to compensate and improve access for impacted communities. In order to fulfill these obligations, the government must take all necessary steps to make this right effective, including opening an Office for Compensation in Sinjar, ensuring that citizens who cannot access Sinjar city can apply for compensation elsewhere, and explore fair modalities to recognize the property rights of households who lack titles for their lands and houses.

Reconciliation and Justice Challenges

The 2014 ISIS attacks against religious minorities have had a profound impact on the coexistence of different ethnic and religious groups in Nineveh province and have left an indelible mark on the history of minorities in Iraq.

Most Yazidis interviewed in Sinjar district and in the KRI declared that Sunnis and Yazidis would never be able to live together in peace and that Sunni Arabs should not attempt to return to Sinjar. The feeling of betrayal runs deep in the Yazidi community. Survivors have repeatedly shared anecdotes of witnessing their own Arab neighbors—people they have known for years—taking part in the killing of Yazidis and the enslavement of women. Told over and over, these stories have created a collective narrative of victimhood and betrayal.

Some individuals interviewed by CIVIC do see reconciliation as necessary for the future of the community in Iraq, but they do not think it possible in the current circumstances. Yazidi individuals blame the Sunni Arab community and tribal Arab leaders’ lack of will as the main obstacles. Those Yazidis who expressed a willingness to reconcile perceive reconciliation as contingent on several

160 CIVIC interviews with staff from NGOs and UN agencies working in the district, February to May 2020.
161 A draft decree was submitted before the Iraqi Council of Representatives in 2019, but it is still in process to be officially endorsed. To date, UNHABITAT has contributed to the resolution of house, land, and property issues in Sinjar by registering families’ claims and mapping the land ownership of Yazidis and Arabs living in the collectives. In collaboration with the authorities, UNHABITAT is issuing occupancy certificates to these families, recognizing their ownership of the land. These occupancy certificates would allow the families to register their properties and obtain land titles once the draft decree is passed by the GOI. Source: CIVIC interview with a member of the House, Lands, and Property Sub-cluster, May 2020.
162 CIVIC interviews with Yazidi civilians, Sinjar district and Dohuk, February 2020.
preconditions, including the criminal prosecution of those involved in the 2014 attacks and reparations for ISIS crimes. By contrast, Sunni Arabs wish to move forward and leave the past behind.

Yazidis believe that neighboring Arab tribes are not doing enough to help the GOI identify those members of their community who joined or supported the ISIS attacks. They demand that tribal leaders provide lists of suspects to the Iraqi authorities and cooperate with the security and judiciary institutions in the prosecution of perpetrators. If grievances between the communities remain unaddressed and there is no formal justice for crimes committed, episodes of violence and revenge attacks are likely to occur as Sunni Arabs return.

Moreover, the Yazidi community blames the GOI and the KRG for their slow response when it comes to accountability, including investigations and protecting evidence. Until the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh (UNITAD) became involved in 2018, little had been done by government authorities to exhume bodies, protect sites for evidence, or investigate.

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165 Research conducted during the past several years suggests that part of the Yazidi community believes that reconciliation requires openly discussing past episodes of violence and abuses, including those prior to 2014, as well as a truth-seeking process to investigate the 2014 events and recognize the genocidal nature of the crimes committed against the Yazidi community. USIP, “Conflict and Stabilization Monitoring Framework: Findings.” See also: “Understanding barriers to return for Eyzidis to Northern Ba’aj,” IOM, March 2020.
166 USIP, “Conflict and Stabilization Monitoring Framework: Findings.”
168 See the UNITAD website: https://www.unitad.un.org/.
Efforts to bring the perpetrators to justice are slow and face a number of obstacles. The Iraqi legal system has not codified crimes against humanity or the crime of genocide in its domestic law. In addition, the overwhelmed Iraqi judicial system has chosen to simplify criminal persecutions against ISIS suspects. Individuals suspected of ISIS affiliation who might have taken part in the Sinjar massacres are being systematically tried according to the anti-terrorist law under the generic crime of “affiliation to a designated terrorist organization.” They are not being tried according to the specific crimes committed, such as murder, kidnapping, sexual violence, or slavery. This practice prevents victims from participating in the trials, and it is not providing justice to the victims or to the community as a collective.

Indeed, members of the Yazidi community do not feel the government is doing enough to formally recognize the suffering of their community or to provide post-harm assistance for the victims of the genocide. While the KRG, the UN, and some individual states have recognized the crimes ISIS militants committed against the Yazidi minority as crimes of genocide, the GOI has not yet formalized such recognition. Six years after the genocide began, the Iraqi Council of Representatives (CoR) has merely issued a non-binding statement on the matter. The KRG passed a law recognizing the Yazidi genocide, as well as a resolution designating August 3 as Yazidi Genocide Remembrance Day. It also called on the GOI to provide reparations to Yazidis, although it did not contemplate the provision of reparations by the KRG. This omission could reinforce the view among Yazidis that the KRG is not taking ownership of the genocide. In fact, the KRG never fully acknowledged the abandonment of Sinjar by Peshmerga forces or their negligence. It also has yet to apologize for not attempting to protect the population. On the contrary, the KRG justified the withdrawal of the Peshmerga forces by arguing that they had been overrun by ISIS. Furthermore, it has helped build a narrative over time that the Yazidi genocide was another genocide against the Kurdish people. This appropriation of the suffering of the Yazidi community has created more resentment and drawn even more members of the community to be critical of the KRG.

Iraq must recognize the crimes against the Yazidi community not as acts of terrorism, but as crimes of genocide. The GOI and KRG must also publicly acknowledge their inability to protect the Yazidi community in Sinjar in 2014 and open criminal investigations to prosecute those involved and provide justice and reparations to the victims. These are some of the first steps authorities need to take in order to redress Yazidis’ suffering and provide reparations for the community.

170 Law No 13 of 2005 on Anti-terrorism.
175 See also: “What do Yazidis make of Kurdish independence?” IRIN, September 19, 2017.
176 Guley Bor explains: “The diversion from the larger picture, comparison between tragedies, downplaying of the Yazidis’ suffering in the hands of IS and attempts to ‘close that page and move on to new Iraq’ without recognition, justice and accountability for the Yazidi has convinced the community that neither government intends to properly deal with the Yazidi case.” See: Guley Bor, “Collective Symbolic Reparations for the Yazidi Genocide,” (forthcoming paper).
Conclusion

Three years after the conclusion of military operations, people from Sinjar are still suffering the consequences of the conflict and have not been able to rebuild their lives. While thousands of IDPs displaced across Iraq remain hesitant to come back to their hometowns, families who have returned continue to struggle due to lack of services, few livelihood opportunities, and precarious security in the area. Many Sunni Arabs and Sunni Kurds remain displaced and uncertain if they will be ever be able to return home, while those who have returned are victims of harassment and live in isolation. The presence of multiple armed and political actors with divergent goals is slowing down reconstruction and stabilization efforts in the area, while security threats such ERWs, Turkish airstrikes, and ISIS attacks deepen fears among both IDPs and Sinjar residents. The GOI urgently needs to design an action plan to address Sinjar’s problems and provide long-term solutions for its inhabitants. This action plan must include political and security stabilization in the area, reconstruction of infrastructure and restoration of services, and the creation of livelihood opportunities. Finally, the GOI needs to ensure there is justice and accountability for the victims of ISIS attacks in Sinjar, including by prosecuting those involved in the atrocities and providing reparations for victims.
Ruins of a building destroyed during military operations against ISIS in Sinjar city, February 2020. Credit: CIVIC/Paula Garcia