As noted, MONUSCO has developed a number of tools and processes for promoting civilian protection and reducing civilian casualties in its military operations that draw on the expertise of both military and civilian personnel, including a Protection Working Group (PWG) a Senior Management Group on Protection (SMG-P) at the national level, and Provincial Senior Management Group on Protection (SMG-PP). To minimize civilian harm and casualties, MONUSCO human rights officials, civilian affairs officials, civilian heads of office, and civilian divisions of the Mission dedicated to information collection and analysis such as the Joint Mission Analysis Center (JMAC) are all consulted by MONUSCO Force in operational and contingency planning, and on the likely impact of certain operations on civilians.
Officials from Joint Human Rights Office (JHRO) now attend daily military briefings, as do Women Protection Advisors and PoC Advisors. The presence of civilian Mission staff in daily military briefings is a new initiative described by one MONUSCO civilian official as “a bit in the baby phase.”However, it is a welcome activity that, along with other collaboration tools developed by the Mission, demonstrates a commitment on the part of both civilian and military components of MONUSCO to reduce civilian harm in military peacekeeping operations.
However, many civilians within MONUSCO saw a need for greater integration of civilian perspectives into military operational planning to promote protection of civilians during operations. One MONUSCO civilian official stated, “It is not about mainstreaming PoC, it is about making [PoC] more the overall focus of the Mission. This is falling down most in operational planning.”Additionally, a second MONUSCO civilian official noted that the SMGP does not meet regularly and that the various coordination meetings are not being sufficiently used to inform military operational planning. A humanitarian official working closely with the Mission voiced a similar view: “The capacities and tools exist, though civilians in the Mission will say that the military doesn’t listen to them. … But in terms of impact [on PoC], it’s still insufficient.”
Specifically, several MONUSCO officials said that civilian information gathering and analysis has evolved and improved greatly over the past year, and that the Mission has a much more detailed understanding of how different armed groups in the DRC operate. Ideally, this analysis on the behavior of armed groups should be fully utilized in operational planning to anticipate and reduce civilian harm. However, this analysis has failed to translate into military operational planning that fully considers civilian analysis on armed groups. According to one MONUSCO civilian official: “We are getting better at analysis. How well that is being coordinated overall with operations is still an issue.”
The primary civilian body tasked with information collection and analysis in MONUSCO is JMAC. In conversations with CIVIC, one UN official noted, “JMAC has [the analysis], but it doesn’t mean senior military officers take it into consideration or are even exposed to it. … So, it’s not necessarily feeding into operational planning or risk assessments.”While Mission officials confirmed to CIVIC that JMAC increasingly exchanges information with MONUSCO Force, wider information sharing and military initiatives based on JMAC analysis may be needed. Currently JMAC reports directly to the Office of the Special Representative to the SecretaryGeneral (SRSG) which limits how widely information from JMAC filters to other Mission components. MONUSCO should consider whether revised terms of reference for JMAC would improve information sharing.
Civilian perspectives also appear to be integrated more thoroughly into broad Mission planning than into tactical military planning and targeting decisions. MONUSCO has in place strong targeting procedures for reducing civilian casualties in its operations. A targeting board oversees operational decisions, targeting rules are based on US and UK army manuals, an indirect fire policy is in place to guide military action, and MONUSCO’s military legal advisor is included in the targeting board to promote civilian harm mitigation. CIVIC learned of several initiatives by MONUSCO Force to engage with Mission civilian officials to improve their targeting practices. In some cases, MONUSCO military officials have consulted civilian staff specializing in gender and protection of women to assist them in distinguishing between female combatants and women held in combatant camps as sexual slaves. Force has also recently begun informally consulting MONUSCO’s civilian Senior Legal Advisor for input in targeting decisions. However, no MONUSCO civilian personnel are systematically included in targeting boards, targeting decisions, or in concept of operations meetings where tactical plans are developed. The processes that exist for consulting civilian colleagues are informal, and MONUSCO Force is resistant to wider inclusion of civilians in targeting and tactical decisions.
A MONUSCO military official involved in Mission planning said that some MONUSCO military officials recognize the value of close coordination with civilians in planning, but friction exists between the military and civilian sides of the Mission at some levels:
“How do we plan with PoC in mind? We need to bring the civilian side in [early]. Does that always work? No. There are tensions between Force and the civilian [side of the Mission]. At the HQ level, [those tensions] aren’t huge, but as you go down, they get bigger. … Hopefully that information [makes its way] into military planning, but even if not, at least the civilian side knows and they can plan through their own channels. Do we understand all PoC policies? No. What we know is who we need to bring in, and they can tell us we can’t do ‘X.’”
Amongst MONUSCO military officials, there is a concern that allowing a larger role in planning for MONUSCO’s civilian personnel—particularly at the tactical and targeting levels—creates a risk of information leaking and damaging the ability of the Force to effectively carry out operations. This inclusion was viewed as an acceptable risk by some elements of the Force, while others felt the risk required careful consideration about which operations civilians should be involved in at a more tactical level. For example, there appears to be less resistance to involvement of civilian counterparts in tactical operations against the FDLR than action against the ADF.
Practically, it is difficult to involve MONUSCO civilian staff deeply at the field level, as senior civilian staff members are rarely deployed permanently to active areas of military operations. There has been some support within the Mission for deploying senior civilian personnel to areas of Force operations to promote better integration of civilian PoC capacity. Such an initiative, while posing potential security risks for civilian staff, could improve the level of inclusion of MONUSCO protection, gender, and political advisors in tactical decision-making and reduce the potential for civilian harm in MONUSCO’s operations. Although there may be some resistance from the Force to a wider inclusion of civilians in concept of operations and targeting meetings to protect the secrecy of their operations, at a minimum MONUSCO’s policies should be adjusted to include the civilian Senior Legal Advisor in targeting board meetings and MONUSCO’s Heads of Office in concept of operations meetings. There is a recruitment process underway to fill the Senior PoC Adviser position, which is currently located in the Rule of Law/Operations pillar, but may be moved under the SRSG. Once in place, the Senior PoC Advisor should also be included closely in tactical and targeting decisions.
Civilian integration into operational planning has been increasing, but on a relatively ad hoc basis and it has taken time for military officials to see the value of civilian involvement in Force operations. Building personal trust and relationships between colleagues takes time, and without more institutionalized avenues of communication and planning at the tactical and targeting level, staff turnover of MONUSCO military officials every six to nine months could impede collaboration. It would be better, however, if the personal element of military-civilian collaboration were minimized in favor of structures promoting systematic and institutionalized coordination.